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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to bring to light some of the most formative innovations in
the Ottoman legal administration that unfolded by the 16th Century. It serves to
macroscopically trace back some of the major developments that led to the crystallization
of the Ottoman legal system and the state’s administration of justice. This study thus aims
to demonstrate the process of the making of Ottoman law through the early attempts of
codifying a comprehensive legal code together with the creation of a unique form of
“Ottoman Hanafism.” Furthermore, it aims to examine the role of some of the state actors
as well as the judiciary in giving rise to a bureaucratic system of administration in
attempting to establish standardization and uniformity throughout the empire and in
bringing in line all of the empire’s provinces.
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INTRODUCTION
Various aspects of the bureaucratic structure of the Ottoman administration after the
conquests of the 15th and 16th Centuries reveal a number of factors that are fundamental
to the understanding of the broader developments of the Ottoman legal system, the
introduction of a series of new policies, and the implications those developments had on
the way society functioned. The incorporation of new territories and the extension of the
empire to new frontiers meant that the empire now encompassed different forms of legal
systems, different religious traditions, different cultural practices, as well as other forms
of administering societies. With this complex legal and cultural landscape, the Ottoman
authorities opted for bringing all its provinces in line with one another through a
bureaucratic process of standardizing the system of administration throughout the empire.
This also called for attempting to create a powerful central authority that would regulate
the core-periphery relations and how the localities were administered. Furthermore, the
Ottoman state intended to construct a judicial system that would serve as a tool of power
assertion and would “Ottomanize” the way justice was administered.
The Ottoman innovations took a number of forms that will be examined
throughout the next few chapters and fitted within the overall framework. What will be
briefly mentioned here in a non-chronological order to serve the introductory purposes of
this study are the wider developments of the administrative legal structure that were
aimed at creating a uniform system of authority and an Ottomanized form of
administering justice. Haim Gerber, Guy Burak, and Nelly Hanna draw attention to some
of the most fundamental and novel administrative policies that were implemented by the
Ottoman authorities. The most foundational of those developments to the Ottoman legal
6

system was appointing the Hanafi School of Law as the official imperial madhhab of the
empire.1 This meant that the legal opinions and rulings that were to be practiced were
limited to what Rudolph Peters refers to as a distinctive form of “Ottoman Hanafism.”2
Other important developments that are closely interconnected with the rise of an official
madhhab is the evolution of the religious institution, which occasioned the appearance of
an imperial learned hierarchy, the appointment of muftis by the imperial authorities, and
the appearance of the position of the grand mufti (seyhulislam) whose role was to oversee
the entire religious institution.3 This also meant that he became the institution’s “chief
judicial and scholarly authority,”4 who was responsible for all its nominations.5
The position of the Sultan by the 16th Century also represented an integral
component of the legal structure of the Ottoman central administration. The definition of
justice in the golden age of Suleyman al-Kanuni went hand in hand with the notion of the
ideal ruler.6 The Sutlan came to be regarded as the embodiment of justice for several
reasons: the power vested in him meant that he ensured the welfare of society by
sustaining a stable powerful central authority;7 the collections of legal codes and firmans
decreed by Sultan Suleyman further idealized him as the “Lawgiver;” and the wide
discretion he exercised when it came to executing siyaset punishments was maintained as

1

Burak, Guy. The Second Formation of Islamic Law: The Hanafi School in the Early Modern Ottoman
Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
2
Peters, Rudolph. “What Does it Mean to Be an Official Madhhab? Hanafism and the Ottoman Empire,” in
The Islamic School of Law: Evolution, Devolution, and Progress. Eds. Peri Baerman, Rudolph Peters, and
Frank E. Vogel. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2005, pp. 147-158.
3
Burak, The Second Formation of Islamic Law, 11
4
Ibid.
5
Gerber, Haim, Islamic Law and Culture, 1600-1840. Leiden: Boston, 1999, p. 30.
6
Yilmaz, Mehmet S. “Crime and Punishment in the Imperial Historiography of Suleyman the Magnificent:
An Evaluation of Nişancı Celâlzâde’s View.” Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, Vol.
60, No. 4 (2007): 427-445.
7
Ibid., 430.
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being in the interest of society, so long as his siyasa is ‘adila and not zalima,8 and
representing “the fulfillment of divine justice.”9 Furthermore, the bureaucratic structure
of the empire by the 16th Century meant that there was a system of administration that
was based on a series of objectives and laws and not one that is based on arbitrariness and
despotism.10 This in turn magnified the just character of Sultan Suleyman’s rule. Another
significant development that went well into the 17th and 18th Centuries was the popular
institution of petitioning the Sultan by the state’s subjects against wrong done by
Ottoman officials,11 based on the encouragement of the sultan himself.12 However, as
James Baldwin argues, those petitions were not only centered on disputes between
subjects and state officials, but also on disputes between the subjects themselves.13 As
such, the Sultan was, in theory, the “supreme judicial authority.”14 He was to preside over
how justice was administered even if he was not the one administering it.
The Imperial Council (divan-i Humayun) was another form of Ottoman
development that was pivotal to the bureaucratic structure of the administration of justice.
The divan functioned as the advisory panel of the sultan on matters regarding political
and military issues.15 It was more concerned with administrative functions and other
policies that did not warrant crucial decisions.16 Apart from those functions, it also served

8

Heyd, Uriel. Studies in old Ottoman Criminal Law. Ed. V.L. Menage. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973, p.
199-200.
9
Yilmaz, “Crime and Punishment in the Historiography of Suleyman,” 430.
10
Gerber, Haim. State, Society, and Law in Islam: Ottoman Law in Comparative Perspective. Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1994, p. 127.
11
Ibid., 154.
12
Inalcik, Halil. “State, Sovereignty and Law During the Reign of Suleyman,” in Suleyman the Second and
His Time. Eds. Halil Inalcik and Cemal Kafadar. Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1993, pp. 59-92.
13
Baldwin, James E. “Petitioning the Sultan in Ottoman Egypt.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and
African Studies 75, no. 3 (2012): 499–524.
14
Heyd, Old Ottoman Criminal Law, p. 227.
15
Imber, Colin. The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power. New York & London: Palgrave
Macmillan Press, 2002, p. 155.
16
Heyd, Old Ottoman Criminal Law, p. 225.
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as a supreme court of justice where the Grand Vizier adjudicated lawsuits and trials on the
basis of shari’a and state laws or he would delegate the task to either the Kadi-‘asker of
Rumeli or the Kadi-‘asker of Anadolu (both were also permanent members of the
imperial council).17 The imperial council was intended to function as another amicable
component of preventing injustices through keeping in check the powers of the state
officials, carrying out siyaset punishments,18 and hearing out the subjects’ grievances.19
Furthermore, what differentiated the Ottoman imperial council from other non-Ottoman
divans such as that of the Mamluk’s dar al-‘adl is that no muftis, not even the
seyhulislam himself, had a seat in the council.20 By the reign of Mehmet II, the imperial
council took on a more formal structure where the sultan abandoned the tradition of
presiding over the council himself and informally administering justice. He in turn
assigned the presidency of the council to his Grand Vizier who took on the sultan’s duties
in the council.21
Another set of developments that was brought about by the Ottoman policies is
the rise in prominence of the position of the qadi—who was an integral part of the
judicial hierarchy—and the shari’a courts.22 The qadi was intended to pass rulings in
accordance to the Hanafi doctrine and the administrative laws as part of the process of
standardizing the judicial system.23 With the appearance of the courthouses in some areas

17

Heyd, Old Ottoman Criminal Law, p. 225.
Inalcik, “State, Sovereignty and Law,” p. 60.
19
Ibid., 89.
20
Heyd, Old Ottoman Criminal Law, p. 225.
21
Imber, The Ottoman Empire, p. 156.
22
Gerber, Islamic Law and Culture, p. 31.
23
Gerber, State, Society, and Law in Islam, p. 63.
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for the first time such as Cairo,24 there was a lot of emphasis that was placed on the role
the qadi played as a judge and as a mediator. However, the demand for the qadi went
beyond just the confines of the courthouse. His role also necessitated keeping in check
the power exercised by the executive authorities25 and overseeing the marketplace.26
Moreover, in regards to the shari’a courts, the Ottoman development of restructuring the
court system aimed at creating a uniform judicial establishment throughout the Ottoman
provinces that would standardize the way justice was administered. 27 There were a
number of other innovative policies enacted by the Ottoman authorities within the court
system itself that will be further discussed throughout this thesis.
One of the initial realizations of the Ottoman objectives of creating a uniform
working legal system for the empire and standardizing the way justice was administered
were the early attempts of codifying the law. It must be noted here that any of the above
mentioned developments could not be treated in their own respect without considering
the evolution of state laws. Even though the kanunname is often attributed to Suleyman I,
the earliest attempts of codification go back to the reign of Mehmet II (1451-81).28
However, it was only under the reign of Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent or Suleyman
al-kanuni (1520-1566) and the enormous territorial expansion that the Ottoman legal
system witnessed its greatest achievements. A lot of the policies that were enacted by the
16th Century helped set in motion the Ottoman legal developments that took place.

24

Hanna, Nelly. “The Administration of Courts in Ottoman Cairo,” in The State and its Servants:
Administration in Egypt from Ottoman Times to the Present. Ed. Nelly Hanna. Cairo: The American
University in Cairo Press, (1995): 45-59.
25
Peters, Rudolph. Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth to the
Twenty-first Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 75.
26
Zilfi, Madeline C. “Sultan Suleyman and the Ottoman Religious Establishment,” in Suleyman the Second
and His Time. Eds. Halil Inalcik and Cemal Kafadar. Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1993, pp. 109-120.
27
Hanna, “The Administration of Courts in Ottoman Cairo,” p. 46.
28
Peters, Crime and Punishment, p. 73.
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Furthermore, the promulgation of state laws and sultanic decrees by the Ottoman
authorities played a great role in the regulation of the core institutional and doctrinal
developments.29 That said, the emergence of a series of Ottoman innovations in the
judicial and administrative systems were a product of the Ottoman kanun. Moreover, to
fully understand the dynamic and complex nature of the kanun, one has to configure the
kanun-shari’a legal discourse that will be highlighted in one way or another throughout
this present study.
By examining the series of the newly enacted Ottoman policies by the state
authorities, one could further understand to what extent those novel developments
contributed to the evolution and structure of the Ottoman legal system. Moreover, by
analyzing how those policies were imposed from above, one could also understand how
society came to be integrated into the legal system and how it interacted with it from
below. With that said, the present study will explore the Ottoman innovative policies in
light of the conquests of the 15th and 16th Centuries and will call into question the extent
of the successes and failures of the Ottoman state’s objectives to standardize and
bureaucratize the system of administration. It has to be further noted here that one must
take into consideration that those broader developments that the Ottoman authorities
intended to implement should be treated as complex and intricate forms of policies that,
in reality, truly captured the dichotomy between law and application—between theory
and practice. Thus, this study will also shed light on the implications the introduction of
the Ottomanized features had on state and society and how, at times, the imposition of
new laws by force were met with opposition.

29

Burak, Guy. “The Second Formation of Islamic Law: The Post Mongol Context of the Ottoman Adoption
of a School of Law.” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 55: 3 (2013): 579-602.
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In light of the main theme of the present work—which is standardization and
centralization of the Ottoman administration—, the first chapter will introduce some of
the broader features that formed the main pillars of Ottoman law and that helped set in
motion the rest of the Ottoman policies that will be examined in the chapters that follow.
The focus here will be on the appointment of the Hanafi madhab as the official school of
law and the codification of the kanun. The first section will attempt to identify the extent
of the Ottoman state’s involvement in the specific branch of Hanafi law and the creation
of a learned hierarchy. Moreover, it will aim to examine the implications of having an
official school of law amidst the conquests of the non-Hanafi Arab lands in the 16th
Century. The second section will work toward highlighting the evolution of the kanun
from the 15th Century to its peak in the 16th Century and capture the change the kanun
introduced to the system of administration. Furthermore, this section will also draw
attention to the kanun-shari’a discourse that has been approached by a lot of scholarly
work as well as highlight how the shari’a was brought within the Ottoman legal context.
This point of contention cannot be addressed without underlining the different approaches
that scholars have taken in attempting to answer the question of whether the shari’a and
kanun were in symbiosis with one another or in conflict.
The second chapter will deal with the Ottoman administration from the standpoint
of the state and the different outlets that were employed to regulate the imperial central
authority. The focus here will be on reviewing the role different agencies of the state
played in administering justice and how they contributed to the evolution of the system of
administration. This chapter will also shed light on the more intricate developments that
took place within the system itself through those agents. The first section will attempt to
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assess the role the sultan played as the embodiment of justice and how his position was
closely interlocked with the promulgation of state laws. It will further try to elucidate
how the doctrine of siyasa shari’ya was utilized as an extra-legal practice executed by the
sultan and his state officials as a form of administering justice. The second section will
examine the introduction of the Imperial Council (divan-i Humayun) as a novel form of
administering justice and regulating administrative policies. It will attempt to study the
function and structure of the divan and how it was intended to centralize the state’s
authority. Furthermore, it will help to explain the place the institution of petitioning the
sultan had in the system of administration.
The third chapter is concerned with the judiciary. It will review the new features
introduced in the judicial system through examining the roles the seyhulislam and qadi
played in the administration of justice. It will portray the different functions they
occupied in the setup of the administrative system and how they were more or less
integrated in the social scene. Section one will be centered on Ebu’s-Su’ud and his efforts
in particular as an important contender in the process of standardizing the administrative
system and legitimizing the state’s authority. The second section will trace back the rise
in prominence of the position of the qadi and the changes this institution has witnessed
over the pre-modern and early modern periods as well as the question of judicial
corruption.
The previous chapter will help explicate how the law and system of
administration were imposed from above, while the last chapter of this study will aim to
portray how society functioned within that system from below. Thus, this chapter aims to
examine the law in practice and how society came to interact with the innovations of the
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Ottoman policies. It will further aspire to depict how at times the restructuring of the
system of administration was met with resistance, and how at other instances people were
starting to integrate those newly introduced features into their daily lives. It will also
examine the process of the Ottomanization of the courthouses and how they served as the
platform for regulating public morality. It will study three Ottoman innovations in the
fields of marriage fees, zina (fornication), and prostitution. The first section will deal with
the reaction of the indigenous class of ulama in face of the Ottoman authorities
implementing novel fees on marriage and the obligation that marriage had to be drawn by
a qadi in court. The second and third sections will attempt to investigate crimes of sexual
transgressions and how the state came to be an integral player in regulating public
morality and revolutionizing how criminal law was dealt with. They will aim to study
how those policies affected the way justice was administered and how they altered the
Ottoman legal landscape. Furthermore, the two sections will primarily shed light on how
the state brought the private affairs into the public sphere.
The focus here is not to create a comprehensive historiography that fulfills all
aspects of the Ottoman law, state, and society in the 16th Century, but rather to capture
snapshots in the history of the administrative developments that occurred over the premodern period in order to have a better understanding of how the series of those new
policies fit together within the framework of standardizing and centralizing the Ottoman
administration. While the main thematic fabric of this study is standardization and
centralization, there are other important themes that are closely interlocked with the
broader theme. One of those that will be highlighted here is the administration of justice.
Through underlining the main functions and patterns of administration of the state’s

14

enforcement agencies, this will help reveal a number of things regarding how justice was
administered on the grassroot level of society. Other thematic elements that will be
examined here are the changes and ramifications brought about by the introduction of
new policies. Finally, a portion of this study is grounded on the concept of legitimacy. In
understanding the reality of the administrator and how he based the legitimation of his
rulership on the façade of justice, one could begin to formulate a clearer image of how
law was imposed from above versus how it was dealt with on the ground level of society.
It would further aid in explicating the reality of the core-periphery relations.

15

CHAPTER 1: THE OTTOMAN LAW-MAKING
This chapter will attempt to analyze the process of the making of Ottoman law and
highlight the changes that were introduced to the administrative system that altered the
legal landscape of the empire. It will showcase how, with the newly appropriated lands,
the Ottoman legal system functioned in relation to other pre-existing systems of law and
how also at other times, it had introduced new forms of state laws that were meant to
ensure their dominance and centralization. 30 This chapter is meant to further draw
attention to the restructuring of the legal system in light of the new features and
innovations introduced by the Ottoman authorities. Furthermore, it will aim to examine
how the changes that were initiated in the Ottoman administration of justice were meant
to bring about a legal process of standardization and uniformity throughout the empire.

I. The Official Madhhab: The Hanafi School of Law
When Sultan Suleyman al-Kanuni visited and ordered the reconstruction of the tomb of
Abu Hanifa—the founding father of the Hanafi School of Law—shortly after the
conquest of Baghdad in 1535, this event had marked a significant type of endorsement of
the Hanafi madhhab by the Ottoman dynasty.31 The development of a distinctive form of
Hanafism by the Ottoman Empire had begun earlier in the 15th Century.32 However, in
order to understand the full scope of how the Ottoman administration developed a
particular branch in the Hanafi School of law and how it regulated a specific type of
shari’a that was well-suited to their own discourse of law as well as understanding the
implications those new features had on the law-making process, it is essential to first
30

Burak, The Second Formation of Islamic Law, p. 14.
Burak, “The Second Formation of Islamic Law,” p. 581.
32
Ibid., 582.
31
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examine the nature of the structure and doctrine of the Hanafi school in the period of the
pre-Ottoman conquest.33
As early as the 8th Century, the Sunni schools of law were rendered as doctrinal
bodies that were based on a “loose social organization”34 that functioned mainly within
the confines of regulating the authority of opinions and governing the legal
understandings of the divine text.35 However, the emergence of the madhhab by the 9th
and 10th Centuries to a great extent was grounded on more organized forms of doctrinal
bodies that were guided by the founding fathers and their subsequent followers.36 There
were greater efforts in the later centuries to organize the structure of the authority of
different opinions within each madhhab37 and to curtail the efforts of ijtihad expounded
by qadis and muftis.38 This was largely due to the belief that scholars no longer possessed
the competence that allowed for the ability to determine which views were correct and
which were not.39 As such, this called for the need to formulate a set of guiding principles
to direct the scholars on which opinions to consult.40
By the 12th Century, there were conflicting views regarding the hierarchy of
authority in the Hanafi madhhab seeing as that—besides the differing opinions of the
founding fathers of the madhhab (Abu Hanifa, Abu Yusuf, and Muhammad alShaybani)—there were less authoritative opinions that prevailed within the Hanafi
doctrine.41 Later scholars proposed different criteria of the hierarchy of authority for

33

Burak, “The Second Formation of Islamic Law,” p. 582.
Ibid.,
35
Ibid.,
36
Ibid.,
37
Ibid.
38
Peters, “What Does it Mean to Be an Official Madhhab?” p. 149-150.
39
Ibid., 150.
40
Ibid.
41
Peters, “What Does it Mean to Be an Official Madhhab?” p. 149.
34
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scholars to adhere to. However, the one that worked its way into the structure of the
Hanafi madhhab dictated that the first opinion to consult when faced with contradictory
opinions regarding a certain matter was that of Abu Hanifa, then Abu Yusuf’s, then
Muhammad al-Shaybani’s, then either that of Zufar or al-Hasan b. Ziyad.42
It is worth mentioning here that the efforts set forth in the development and
structure of the Hanafi madhhab were not promoted by state authorities.43 According to
Burak, the practice of patronage as well as supporting and appointing certain jurists to
specific positions by the state or the ruler goes back to the Umayyad and ‘Abbasid eras.
In the reign of the Ayyubids and Mamluks, the state could also adopt one or more schools
of law.44 However, the degree of state intervention was limited. Burak argues that state
authorities did not dictate what was to be considered law and what was not. They neither
interceded in the doctrinal structure of different madhhabs nor regulated the hierarchy of
the authority of opinions.45 This was fundamentally different from the Ottoman Empire.
The Ottoman attempts to create a standardized legal system that would contribute to the
bureaucratic administrative structure of the state dictated different types of practices and
marked a degree of state intervention in the religious doctrine. Rudolph Peters contends
that such an inconstant setup of the Hanafi madhhab that was characterized by the
different conflicting views was difficult to convert into “positive law,” as in rearrange it
in such a way that was easy to be administered by the qadi courts.46 Nevertheless, he
argues that the Ottoman efforts of creating a particular type of Hanafism that was well-

42

Peters, “What Does it Mean to Be an Official Madhhab?” p. 150.
Burak, “The Second Formation of Islamic Law,” p. 582.
44
Ibid.,
45
Ibid.
46
Peters, “What Does it Mean to Be an Official Madhhab?” p. 147.
43
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suited to their administrative requirements aided in altering the school’s doctrine from
one that was marked by contradictions to one that became “more or less homogenous.”47
The evolution of the Hanafi madhhab after the Ottoman conquests was to a large extent
interlocked with the Ottoman sultan’s and state authorities’ intervention in the regulation
and restructuring of the religious doctrine. 48 There are a number of factors that
contributed to the departure of the Hanafi madhhab from pre-Ottoman to post-Ottoman
adoption of the particular branch of Hanafism. According to Burak, “institutionally, this
change was both reflected in and enabled by the development of an imperial learned
hierarchy with fairly standardized career and training tracks.”49 By the early 15th Century,
this imperial learned hierarchy was well established and enforced. 50 The Ottoman
authorities regulated the structure of the hierarchy through the appointment of muftis and
the development of the office of the Grand Mufti (seyhulislam) who was the head of the
imperial learned hierarchy and whom also played an integral role in regulating a certain
type of shari’a—or a certain type of Hanafism—that was consistent with the Ottoman
innovations introduced by the sultan and state authorities.51 Having said that, there is a
clear divergence here from the classical role muftis played. A mufti in the classical sense
was a religious expert who gave his fatwa on the basis of questions addressed to him
regarding legal and religious matters. He contributed to the governance of the religious
doctrine seeing as that he had the authority to exercise his own independent reasoning
(ijtihad) in dispensing new injunctions that would guide followers of the madhhab and

47

Peters, “What Does it Mean to Be an Official Madhhab?” p. 147.
Burak, The Second Formation of Islamic Law, p. 10.
49
Burak, “The Second Formation of Islamic Law,” p. 584.
50
Burak, The Second Formation of Islamic Law, p. 11.
51
Ibid. A section in Chapter 2 of this study is dedicated to the office of the Seyhulislam.
48
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advise judges in legal rulings.52 Unlike qadis, the appointment of muftis was not a statesponsored practice. Rather, the mufti acted as an independent scholarly authority who
was free from such appointments by the ruler of the community.53 During the Mamluk
period, a jurist could teach law and dispense fatwas—thus, become a mufti—when
granted the permission to do so by his mentor.54 This is essentially different from the later
Ottoman practices where the appointment of the mufti was marked by state
intervention.55
Another factor that saw the shift from pre-Ottoman to post-Ottoman practices was
the establishment of an educational system by the Ottoman Empire as yet another
innovation that was introduced by the 15th Century alongside the development of an
imperial learned hierarchy.56 The imperial madrasa system was systematically developed
by the Ottoman dynasty with a network of teaching institutions that were founded
throughout the empire. This development later ordained that high-ranking judicial and
bureaucratic positions required the graduation from the imperial madrasa system
throughout the empire.57 What separates here the Ottoman practices from previous ones is
that earlier dynasties’ functions in the learning institutions was in regulating its
administration and funding. However, the Ottoman dynastic practices went beyond the
confines of the administrative procedures of the educational institutions. They became
highly involved in the regulation of the doctrine and curriculum of the madrasa system.
There was a sultanic decree ordered by Sultan Suleyman in 1556 dictating the texts that

52

Burak, “The Second Formation of Islamic Law,” p. 584.
Ibid.,
54
Ibid.,
55
Ibid.,
56
Ibid., 585.
57
Ibid.
53
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were to be studied by the students as well as the order of studying those texts in the
imperial madrasas.58 Moreover, serving as an extension of the sultan, the Grand Mufti by
the second half of the 16th Century gave such orders on the specific texts to be studied.59
In being involved in the regulation of the Hanafi doctrine and curriculum of the
educational system, the Ottoman authorities were opting for uniformity in the texts to be
consulted and studied.
A third aspect that signals the degree of state intervention in the Hanafi doctrine is
the Ottoman dynastic involvement in the genealogy (tabaqat) of the learned hierarchy
and the regulation of the madhhab’s authority of opinions. Burak argues that by creating
a certain chain of authority of the members of the hierarchy and tying them back to the
founding father of the school, Abu Hanifa, as well as excluding the traditions of certain
Hanafi jurists in other parts of the empire such as the Arab provinces, the genealogies
were meant to direct members of the school to specific legal matters that they could
consult in their judgments.60 Moreover, the Ottoman authorities also intervened in the
regulation of the Hanafi doctrine in determining which authority of opinion to observe.
The chain of authority of opinion that prevailed in the 12th Century in the Hanafi
madhhab was already systematized and well underway by the 16th Century in such a
manner that it was readily consulted.61 The chain of the prevailing opinions and the most
authoritative ones became clearly underlined in the Hanafi madhhab. In their letters of
appointments, qadis were specifically instructed by the Ottoman sultan to follow the most
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authoritative of the Hanafi opinions.62 If they did otherwise, their sentences would be
nullified.63 However, the sultan issued a number of decrees enjoining qadis to follow less
authoritative opinions—thirty-two of those decrees alone were issued in the 16th
Century.64 Such orders made by the sultan either encouraged preferred opinions of muftis
of the madhhab or forewent an authoritative opinion over a less authoritative one.65 In
one of the cases that prompted a sultanic order, the weaker opinion regarding the law of
qasama was imposed. In the case where a body is found on privately owned property
with signs indicating a violent murder, the next of kin have the right to demand blood
money after swearing a number of oaths accusing the owners of the property of the
murder. Following the opinions of Abu Hanifa and Muhammad al-Shaybani, the
solidarity group of the owner of the property is held accountable for the payment of the
blood money, whereas Abu Yusuf maintained the weaker opinion that the actual
inhabitants of the property were to be held accountable.66 Peters argues that the sultanic
decree enforced the weaker opinion here in order to “stimulate the vigilance of the
residents and their diligence in keeping their neighborhood safe, since they themselves
and not their solidarity group were held liable.”67

The Madhhab: From Mamluk to Ottoman
The Ottoman authorities were faced with a different challenge in the hegemony of the
Hanafi madhhab after the conquests of the Arab regions in the 16th Century. Earlier in the
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13th Century, the Mamluk Sultan al-Zahir Baybars initiated the tradition of appointing a
chief qadi (qadi al-qudat) from each of the Sunni schools of law in Cairo.68 By the
second half of the 14th Century, this practice had been adopted by several other cities in
the Arab region.69 It is essential here to understand how this quadruple legal system
functioned in order to fathom how the Ottoman authorities restructured the administrative
system in such a way to adapt it to the legal landscape of the newly appropriated Arab
lands and to bring them in line with the other provinces.
Sherman Jackson provides an interpretation behind Sultan Baybars’ decision to
implement a quadruple judicial system. He argues that the Chief Shafi’i Qadi, Ibn bint alA’azz, alienated the opinions of jurists belonging to other madhhabs and curtailed the
enforcement of their rulings, which went against the preference of some of the followers
of the other madhhabs.70 Thus, it is argued, Sultan Baybars wanted to restrain the power
of Ibn bint al-A’azz by appointing three other Chief Qadis without officially dismissing
him seeing as that he enjoyed the support of the public who were mostly affiliated with
the Shafi’i madhhab.71 However, Yossef Rapoport establishes a different argument that
focuses on the institutional motive behind Sultan Baybars’ decision rather than the
political and religious objectives. He underscores two main aspects that could further
elucidate Baybars’ judicial ruling: the legal system’s need for predictability and
flexibility.72 He argues that the system had become rigid and too inadaptable and thus
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needed to be institutionally more flexible with a predictable set of canons to follow.73 The
reason for this rigidity seemingly goes back to the 12th Century shift from the tradition of
ijtihad to the tradition of taqlid.74 As mentioned earlier, this adjustment was meant to
curb the independent reasoning of judges and achieve uniformity in the implementation
of rulings based on the most authoritative opinions in their respective madhhab. 75
According to Rapoport, “without taqlid, i.e., without the madhhab providing an objective
basis for legal decisions, judicial actions would have been perceived as inherently
arbitrary.”76 However, the culture of taqlid did not provide much room for judges to
adapt the law to new social conditions.77 It was also challenging to introduce new features
to the doctrine of a madhhab seeing as that judges were specifically decreed in their
appointments to follow only the rulings of their respective madhhab. 78 This also
constituted a part of the rigidity of the legal system. For instance, appointing only one
Chief Qadi from the Shafi’i madhhab entailed that a bride could not add stipulations in
her marriage contract in accordance to the Shafi’i doctrine; however, the Hanbali doctrine
allowed it. Marriage of a minor is not permitted in the Shafi’i doctrine but is allowed in
the Hanafi doctrine.79 Thus, having a quadruple judicial system offered an alternative
solution to provide more flexibility for the population in raising the doctrines of all four
Sunni schools to the same equal status even if they chose to follow the culture of taqlid.80
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Changing the institutional judicial structure in the Mamluk period accommodated
the social needs of the population by allowing the individual to choose the court forum
that best suited his/her interest. Ido Shahar refers to the engagement in the interrelations
of the madhhabs as “forum shopping.” 81 This “forum shopping” was at times a
mechanism employed by the state through its representatives to prevent certain rulings
from taking place.82 Shahar provides the example of heresy where a person who is
accused of heresy could manage for instance to appear before a Shafi’i judge—who
spares the lives of the heretics who repent—before witnesses go to a Maliki qadi—who
imposes the capital punishment on heretics—and is thus protected by the manipulation of
the madhhabs.83 This concept of manipulating the interrelations between madhhabs was
also extended to other social scenes in regards to property and personal status. According
to Hanna, a person could purchase a house according to one madhhab and get married or
divorced the following day according to another madhhab.84
This legal system did not concur well with the objectives of the Ottoman
authorities of attempting to enforce standardization and uniformity. The concept of
“forum shopping” or having room for madhhab manipulation was not a system that could
contribute to the hegemony of the Hanafi doctrine that the Ottomans were aiming to
administer. According to Peters, “[the Ottoman state] was motivated by a bureaucratic
tendency to impose uniformity in the administration of justice based on Hanafi doctrine,
at the expense of pragmatic flexibility.”85 Their objective was to restructure the legal
system in such a way that would yield centrality to their administration of justice, even if
81
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that meant introducing features that were met with resistance. Thus, the Ottoman
authorities cancelled the Mamluk tradition of having a quadruple judicial system and
replaced it with a single Hanafi Chief Qadi (qadi al-qudat) who was appointed by the
sultan.86 The qadi who served as the qadi al-qudat was typically a Turk who was not
fluent in Arabic and communicated through a translator. He was assigned a one-year term
in Cairo, which was to a degree a prestigious position that helped in elevating him in
status.87 The restructuring of the judicial system by the Ottoman authorities did not
necessarily denote that the Hanafi law replaced the other madhhabs. The other Sunni
schools of law continued to function with each courthouse having a qadi represent each
madhhab.88 Grasping how this system functioned is of importance here in order to have a
clearer visualization of how the Ottoman authorities, on the one hand, aimed at creating a
centralized legal system and how, on the other, it allowed for a degree of flexibility in the
making of the law.
Even though the qadis and muftis in the Balkans and Anatolia were instructed to
only exclusively apply Hanafi law, the case with the newly appropriated Arab regions
was different wherein the qadis and muftis of other Sunni schools were integrated within
the system.89 In spite of the Ottoman authorities having abolished the quadruple judicial
system, there still existed a degree of leeway in administering the legal rulings of other
madhhabs. There is a difference of opinion within the Hanafi doctrine regarding the
jurisdiction of qadis and whether it is the right of the defendant or the plaintiff to choose
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the court forum.90 However, the case was fairly different in the large cities of the Arab
regions where there were several qadis affiliated with different madhahbs in one place
and whom also exercised equal jurisdiction.91 Thus, to limit the jurisdiction of qadis to a
certain extent, the sultan issued a decree through a fatwa by Ebu’s-Su’ud prohibiting
qadis from hearing cases and passing judgments based on a madhhab that was not the
defendant’s choice of forum. Sentences that were to be dispensed by qadis against this
decree would be deemed as void.92 Peters argues that this was probably a method to
curtail a previous practice in the Arab regions of implementing the Shafi’i doctrine in
cases where the defendant did not appear before the court.93 However, another distinction
in the Ottoman practice that aimed at upholding Hanafi law was that even though they
permitted other non-Hanafi qadis to pass sentences on the basis of the defendant’s
madhhab, the rulings issued also warranted the approval of the Hanafi qadi—who was
given precedence among other qadis—for them to be enforced.94 Still, there was a limit to
the degree of enforcement of non-Hanafi rulings. According to the Hanafi jurists, the
non-Hanafi sentences had to abide by the basic principles of Qur’an and Hadith.95 There
were also certain issues that were deemed legal by other madhhabs but could not be
enforced by Hanafi qadis. One of those issues that were recognized by all madhhabs
except the Hanafi’s entailed that sentences could be delivered on the basis of an oath by
the plaintiff and a testimony by one witness. 96 Judith Tucker offers an interesting
example that showcases the Hanafi muftis’ and qadis’ endorsement of non-Hanafi
90
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rulings. She notes that in 17th and 18th Centuries Syria and Palestine, Hanafi jurists
enforced rulings by Hanbali and Shafi’i qadis and requested they appear in courts when it
came to the annulment of a marriage due to a husband not providing spousal support to
his wife on the basis of poverty or because he had disappeared without leaving behind
sufficient support. This was a case that did not necessitate an annulment of marriage
based on the Hanafi doctrine; thus, Hanafi jurists were willing to endorse other nonHanafi sentences for expediency in annulling marriages on the basis of desertion.97
It is intriguing to perceive how the Ottoman authorities articulated their own form
of Hanafism through the interactions with other madhhabs and previous practices that
yielded a new form of legal structure. The practices and mechanisms employed by the
Ottoman authorities conveys that in spite of the Ottoman objective of upholding Hanafi
law as a form of bureaucratic standardization and uniformity, it operated differently when
it was faced with the legal diversity of the interrelations between the madhhabs in the
Arab regions. Shahar argues that, “the ruling elites of both empires [Mamluk and
Ottoman] were cautious not to break the fundamental institutional structure of four
equally legitimate schools of law.” 98 Thus, the efforts put forth by the Ottoman
authorities in the restructuring of the judicial system were shaped in such a way as to
integrate legal pluralism that existed in the Arab region and incorporate it in their policies
of Ottomanization.
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II. Kanun As Imperial Law
To further examine the Ottomanization process of standardizing and centralizing the
administrative system, it is important to first understand the legal context within which
the state practices and newly introduced policies took place. The previous section shed
light on the internal dynamics that were behind the appointment of an official Hanafi
madhhab and the process of altering a particular form of shari’a with Hanafi
interpretations that fit well with the vitality of the Ottoman dynasty. Those institutional
practices that introduced changes to the structure of the official madhhab—as well as
other administrative practices that will be discussed throughout this study—all fall under
the rubric of kanun seeing as that those practices materialized either in the form of kanun
regulations codified by the state authorities or were legitimized by them.99 Another vital
aspect to briefly address that is of relevance here and the next chapters is the problematic
dialogue of theory and practice or of law and application. This issue raises several
questions in regards to which legal codes were applied and the nature of the legal
administration that developed. This section will thus attempt to showcase the evolution of
the kanun as a complex legal system that developed independently of the unique
Ottomanized Hanafi doctrine in order to further understand its relation to shari’a and how
it structured the Ottoman system of administration.100
The kanun is considered as one of the most significant innovations of the Ottoman
legal system.101 State-enacted laws in principle existed before the Ottoman Empire;102
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however, what distinguished the kanun from other previous state laws were the Ottoman
authorities early attempts to codify the law and standardize the legal system throughout
the empire.103 According to Gerber, the promulgation of kanun resulted from the need for
a bureaucratic state to have a codified legal code that was to be enforced in all its
provinces.104 The kanunname (often referred to as state law, secular law, dynastic law,
imperial law, or sultanic law) is a collection of kanun regulations that constitute short
summaries of sultanic decrees and firmans, which came to be regarded as a distinct
institutional body of laws that is separate from the shari’a.105 Kanun was used to denote
several meanings. There were the sultanic decrees that were enacted in regards to specific
legal matters; there were kanunnames that were issued for specific groups of people or
for a particular region; and there were the comprehensive kanunnames that were
implemented on the whole empire.106 Moreover, kanun at times also conveyed the same
meaning as custom (‘urf) in Ottoman texts by the 16th Century. In such cases, it was often
associated with the term kadim (old or ancient)—kanun-ı kadim—to symbolize old
customary practices. 107 This could be viewed as a sort of affirmation that kanun
confirmed local customary practices, and certain kanun regulations were referred to as
“accepted [or] local usage.”108
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The kanun propagated by the sultan was essentially meant to be valid for the
period of his reign, but could be revoked or renewed by his successors.109 However, most
kanuns were confirmed seeing as that they were often regarded as common existing
practices and were not changed unless there were fundamental political, social, or
economic changes or if a sultan decided to dissolve certain kanun regulations that he
deemed as religious innovations.110 Furthermore, the most closely linked office to the
imperial kanuns was that of the nişancı.111 He operated the administrative functions of
authenticating the tuğra (imperial seal) and other official documents.112 The nişancı dealt
with the process of validating the kanuns by drafting them and checking their consistency
and correctness with other previous kanuns.113 He would then validate them by first
officially presenting them to the sultan and when he received his approval he would affix
them with the tuğra and they became law.114 Often when the seyhulislam or a mufti had
inquiries regarding what the kanun was considering a certain matter they would turn to
the nişancı for legal information.115 After the kanunname had been validated, it was sent
out to qadis and provincial governors to administer it116 (sometimes at the request of
qadis) with strict regulations to administer justice “in accordance with the noble shari’a
and the exalted kanun.”117 However, when it came to capital or corporal punishments,
they were instructed to administer them “in accordance with the imperial kanunname.”118
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The kanun generally dealt with topics that were not touched upon by the
shari’a.119 Mehemd II (1451-81)—also known as Mehmed the Conqueror—was the first
sultan to enact laws that sought universal application and were regarded as a distinct body
of laws separate from the shari’a.120 He was responsible for the promulgation of two
separate kanun collections; one that generally dealt with the bureaucratic structure of the
state and the organization of the official posts of the class of ulama and his executive
officials; the other dealt with taxation and fines.121 Furthermore, the more general set of
sultanic laws dealt with fiscal, criminal, and land laws.122 Those laws were later subject to
a series of modifications under Mehmed II’s successor Bayzeid II (1481-1512), who
renewed and enacted more comprehensive decrees.123 However, it was not until the reign
of Suleyman al-Kanuni that the kanun witnessed its greatest achievements. He was
known for his promulgation of many strict sultanic decrees and for the establishment of a
more developed and inclusive penal code.124 It was also during his reign that Sultan
Suleyman sought to homogenize the kanun with the shari’a and was aided by his
seyhulislam, Ebu’s-Su’ud, in the attempts of reconciling both legal codes.125 A new
kanunname with more modifications and additions, titled Kanun-i ‘Osmani, was enacted
in 1534 under the reign of al-Kanuni.126
By order of Sultan Suleyman, a copy of his new kanunname and Bayzeid’s were
to be placed in the courts of all towns across the empire.127 However, implementing the
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kanunname in every province did not necessarily entail the nullification of provincial preexisting legal codes. To steer clear of any disorders from arising from the introduction of
new Ottoman policies to the local administrative systems, the Ottoman authorities did not
abolish the laws or the local customs and traditions. This was also due to the fear of
changes affecting tax revenues.128 Thus, there were general surveys conducted in every
sancaks (“the basic administrative unit of the Ottoman Empire”)129 throughout the 16th
Century.130 Those tax and population surveys aimed at keeping in check the tax revenues
and statuses of different groups in each given sancak and also precipitated the enactment
of new laws.131 The process of drafting the kanunname for each sancak based on the
survey and registration of the population entailed the commissioner of the survey to
eliminate certain local practices and traditions that contradicted the shari’a or kanun and
to send the rest of them to the sultan for his approval.132 Moreover, the sancak surveys
were also detrimental in establishing the administrative system in a given region because
problems at times arose and complaints of local groups of people or the need to increase
tax revenue called for the commissioner of the survey to recommend the sultan to revise
or abolish certain laws.133 Under the reign of Bayzeid II, it had become common usage to
start the survey registers of each sancak with its local kanunname that would aid in the
settlement of disputes.134 However, even though each sancak had its own kanunname, it
was established that they must also adhere to the general kanunname of the empire
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(kanun-i osmani).135 The kanunname of Egypt of 1525 provides a good example here. It
was divided into different chapters that detailed the administrative system and its
hierarchy, which identify who the governor of Egypt is, the administrators of the smaller
provinces within Egypt, the Ottoman military units, and finally the taxes that Egypt was
due to pay.136 Additionally, it specified what the duties of the governor were and the
overall legal and fiscal system of the province.137 Attached with the kanunname of Egypt
was the survey registry that was conducted for this particular region.138 Moreover, a copy
of the kanunname of Egypt was instructed to be placed in the Divan of Egypt and sent out
to every qadi to publicize it in his district.139 This underpins the extent of the Ottoman
bureaucratization attempts in creating a uniform administrative system and integrating
kanun in the process of law making and instilling its bureaucratic character throughout
the empire. For instance, in the preface of the kanunname of Egypt—seeing as that
crimes had increased overtime—it was declared that “disputes and feuds can no longer be
decided by the swords of the tongue of the guardians of the holy law [i.e. the qadis], but
require the tongue of the sword of those empowered to inflict heavy punishment [i.e. nonshari’a judges].”140 This portrays one of the ways of how kanun was introduced as a
necessity to regulate the legal process and administer justice. Hence, it enjoined that
anyone who commits a crime must be punished by both the kanun and the shari’a.141
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Sultan Suleyman is known to have developed the most comprehensive body of
criminal regulations in the kanun-i osmani.142 According to Gerber, it was “the final and
most important version of the Ottoman penal kanun.”143 There were many new additions
in this version of kanunname in the field of criminal law seeing as that one of the
objectives was to create a series of legislations alongside that of the shari’a’s for criminal
procedures. However, the main objective was to protect the society against the oppressive
actions of the executive officials.144 Thus, when Sultan Suleyman initiated the series of
kanun reforms, he aimed at curbing the power exercised by his executive officials in
administering justice by placing the qadi in charge of overseeing their criminal
proceedings.145 Another objective that is found in the preambles of the kanunname was to
prevent injustices from being committed. Consequently, people had to be familiar with
the kanunname to know what rights they possessed. That being so, qadis and governors
were commonly instructed to read out the kanunname in public and it was also made
available for purchase in the 16th and 17th Centuries.146
There was a certain gap in the way some crimes were dealt with and there were no
comprehensive legal provisions to enforce punishments in cases that created ambiguity.
However, with the kanunnames of Sultan Suleyman and his predecessors on criminal
punishments, the state played an integral role in the way justice was administered as it
now had covered a broad range of criminal transgressions.147 The kanun had thus come to
act as a form of law enforcement.148 One of the main features of its criminal code is that
142
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many punishments became “fiscalized.” 149 Besides the ta’zir punishments that were
administered, a fine (ta’zir bi’l-mal)150 was prescribed usually depending on the number
of strokes that were assigned.151 The payment of a fine was considered to be one of the
innovations introduced by the Ottoman authorities. In addition to the fines, punishments
also took the shape of banishments, flogging, public scorn, and imprisonment. 152
Monetary fines in particular were not known to the criminal regulations of the shari’a
and were considered by some ulama as an unlawful form of state revenue.153 However,
this form of punishment, besides ta’zir, were prescribed in most of the articles of the
Ottoman criminal code when it came to crimes of sexual transgressions, theft, drinking of
wine, bodily harm and killing, and other criminal provisions.154 Fines seem to have been
the favored form of penalty for regular crimes. It is argued that this was due to the fact
that fines generated revenue for the state the same way taxes did.155 Yet, this criminal
penalty was abused by some of the executive officials who illicitly extorted fines.
However, under one of the articles of the Ottoman criminal code, one of the protective
functions of the qadis was to reclaim the fines illegally collected by the executive
officials.156 In the kanunname of Aintab of 1536, it reads, “For every crime that occurs,
no matter how great or small, [the penalty] shall be decided with reference to the
Ottoman Kanun. Force shall not be used to exact anymore than that.”157 This depicts the
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tight control kanun had in administering justice and how it aimed at protecting the people
against injustices caused by the executive officials.
However, unlike modern criminal law, criminals were also subject to other forms
of punishments for acts that were not addressed in the kanunname with prescribed
penalties. Crimes that were not alluded to in the kanunname could be punished at the
discretion of the qadi or executive officials through administering ta’zir or siyaset
punishments.158 Ta’zir and siyaset punishments were two of the most commonly used
legal principles in the kanun and constitute pivotal elements in the making of Ottoman
law. There are differences in the objectives of both forms of punishments. Ta’zir was
meant to reform the acts of the offender and deter any future offences, while the objective
of the siyaset punishments was to “protect society from persons whose acts constitute a
danger to law and order.”159 The discretionary punishments of ta’zir were within the
jurisdiction of both the qadi and the executive officials, while the siyaset punishments
were the authority of the sultan and his executive officials. 160 Moreover, ta’zir
punishments were administered in cases of crimes that transgressed the shari’a while the
siyaset punishments were administered under the will of the sultan of “any act threatening
public order.” 161 Even though the siyaset punishments were long embedded in the
Muslim states long before the conquests of the Ottoman Empire, they had grown a more
Ottomanized character and the concept of siyasa shari’ya was integrated within the
kanunname and administrative documents. Besides the enforcement of ta’zir
punishments, the siyaset punishments took a more extra-legal form in the administration
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of justice. Siyaset were referred to capital or severe corporal punishments, which varied
from execution, cutting off the hand, beard, male organs, nose, public scorn, to branding
of the forehead.162 Besides discretionary punishments administered by the qadi and the
prescribing of fines or strokes when it comes to criminal transgressions, the siyaset
punishments came to form a separate code of law called siyasetname that existed as early
as Bayzeid II’s reign.163 However, it was later added with Mehmed II’s criminal code.
Despite being integrated within the text of the kanunname, the siyasetname had not lost
its separate character. The third chapter of kanun-i osmani covers crimes that are dealt
with siyaseten.164 Those capital punishments often covered habitual crimes that were
classified under the concept of “sa’in fi’l-ard bi’l-fasad—the fomenter of corruption in
the world.”165 This concept of sai bil’-fasad was expanded by the Ottoman authorities
and came to constitute a legal principle in the kanun.166 According to Gerber, “people in
Bursa were condemned to death on legal principles characteristic of the kanun system,
such as siyaset and sai bil’-fasad.”167
Just as there were kanun regulations that prescribed siyaset punishments to be
administered by the executive officials, there were also, as mentioned earlier, regulations
that were meant to keep the power exercised by the executive officials in that area in
check. The Ottoman Criminal Code dictates that if a qadi examines the facts of a case and
could not establish enough evidence for him to enforce a sentence in accordance with the
shari’a, he is then entitled to produce a certificate (huccet) wherein he records and details
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all the facts of the case without suggesting a specific sentence. The qadi would then hand
it over to the executive officials who would in turn produce a punishment siyaseten.168
Nonetheless, the qadi still exercised the authority to investigate a case and prove the ill
repute of a suspect before the officials could administer torture or imprison him
siyaseten. 169 Despite bearing a separate character than that of the kanun, there are
similarities that could be drawn between siyasa shari’ya and kanun. They both administer
punishments that go beyond penalties prescribed by the shari’a. They both could convict
and punish a suspect who is ill reputed and has a record of offences. They also allow for a
testimony of a person who the shari’a deems as incompetent, and they permit the
imprisonment and torture of a suspect in order to extract confessions. Thus, Heyd argues,
“the penal kanun [was] a realization, at least partial, of [the] idea of siyasa shari’ya or
siyasa ‘adila.”170
The evolution of kanun introduced a standardized legal system that was to a
degree mindful of pre-existing practices and traditions to an empire that constituted a
large array of different provincial enforcement agencies and judicial domains. It was far
reaching in the sense that it regulated new aspects in the lives of the public by entering
the realm of crimes and sexuality in a different manner than was regulated by the shari’a.
The emergence of the state’s bureaucratic and administrative system could be argued was
a product of kanun. The Ottoman authorities attempted to restructure the state’s
administration in a way that would yield a more efficient administration of justice and
aimed at utilizing the kanun as a protective function against injustices. It also served as a
tool to standardize the law of procedure as well as employed certain principles in their
168
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system of administration that gave certain extra-legal actions legitimacy. As such, the
kanun came to form the integral element of the making of Ottoman law and was often the
device resorted to for the introduction of Ottomanized policies and innovations.
The Kanun-Shari’a Discourse
Understanding how kanun developed in nature as a distinct body of laws makes it less
challenging for one to grasp the broad and complex relationship between kanun and
shari’a. The kanun-shari’a discourse has been the subject of extensive scholarly work
and there have been many attempts to contextualize the relationship of both codes of law
and examine how they altered the Ottoman polity. As previously mentioned, the kanun in
principle as state-enacted law was not in itself an innovation; however, it was the practice
of the law that the Ottoman authorities developed and the areas that it touched upon that
was unprecedented.171 Moreover, it was how the Ottoman kanun was instigated and
implemented vis-à-vis the shari’a that distinguished it from other legal systems. Often the
literature that exists on the kanun-shari’a rhetoric is either divided on whether the kanun
had indeed supplemented the shari’a or superseded it in practice. One school of thought
follows the rhetoric that they were indeed in line with one another, while the other is of
the opposing opinion.172 However, when examining the Ottoman legal discourse the
broad understanding of the relationship between kanun and shari’a had often been
approached as one that yielded tangible tensions. There were many attempts, nonetheless,
to portray the consolidative nature of both legal systems as one that was smooth and in
harmony.
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The tensions between kanun and shari’a were most notable when it came to the
field of criminal proceedings. Kanun often dealt with cases concerning public law and
promulgated laws that regulated the relationship between the public and the state. Those
were aspects that were not necessarily unequivocally covered in the shari’a. However,
when it came to criminal law and the administration of justice, the shari’a had explicit
regulations that pinpointed different types of punishments for specific given crimes. In
spite of this, the kanun interfered in matters of criminal proceedings and introduced new
regulations that operated outside the workings of the shari’a.173 In theory, the kanun was
meant to reaffirm shari’a practices and legal decisions. Indeed, this was the case when it
came to some codified or non-codified laws. In several instances, the kanun legally
conformed to penalties laid down by the shari’a by reiterating in wording that a crime
shall be punished “in accordance with the shari’a;” at other times, the kanun adhered to
the prescribed punishments of the shari’a without necessarily restating so.174 However,
there are many other cases that depict the extent of the divergence of the kanun from the
shari’a. It was earlier revealed that the kanun prescribed monetary fines as a form of
penalty. This was something that was at odds with the shari’a, especially given that those
fines were at times administered to cases that necessitated hudud punishments under the
shari’a. However, in order not to supersede the hudud punishments, it was at times
specified that fines were to be implemented only in cases where the given shari’a
punishment was not administered, except this was not necessarily always the case.175
When it came to capital or severe corporal punishments (siyaset punishments), the
kanun prescribed hudud penalties but not for cases that necessitate them. For instance,
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there are several crimes that were punishable by the amputation of the hand siyaseten—a
penalty prescribed for theft under the shari’a—such as “knifing people habitually and for
habitually forging decrees of legal certificates.”176 There were other types of siyaset
punishments that were unfamiliar to the shari’a such as castration, branding of the
forehead, branding of a woman’s vulva, cutting off the ear and nose, and other forms of
penalties for different offences. However, the most commonly prescribed penalty was the
monetary fine even for cases that required the hadd punishment. The hudud punishments
were not the go-to forms of chastisement that was often employed by the state
authorities.177
Gerber argues that the kanun is both a confirmation and a violation of the shari’a.
It’s a confirmation in the sense that it endorses the hudud punishments as state laws; yet,
it violates the concept of huquq Allah when it preserves that murder is also a state law
seeing as its not one of the hudud Allah.178 It is a daunting process to fully attempt to
come to terms with what the Ottomans wished to achieve by enacting kanun. However,
there is the point of contention that is often raised in regards to the issue of political and
religious legitimacy. The Ottoman authorities aimed to create kanun as a symbol of
justice—something which resonates throughout the preambles and articles of the
kanunname in one way or another that the main aim was to protect the common people.
The Ottomans’ political legitimacy became hinged on this notion of justice.179
When it came to the religious legitimacy of the kanun, however, it was not a
leveled subject empty of debate. In the process of Ottoman law making, the imperial
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learned hierarchy became integrated in the system of administration in such a way that
deemed it at times difficult and at times easy to consolidate the tensions between kanun
and shari’a. Some ulama where at odds with the kanun and questioned its necessity
seeing as that they believed that the shari’a was sufficient. On the other hand, other
jurists believed that kanun was beneficial for the welfare (maslaha) of the society and
that so long as it did not contradict the shari’a, there was no harm in the sultanic
enforcement of those laws.180 The tensions usually materialized when it came to certain
kanun regulations that introduced innovations that were in clear contradiction with the
shari’a,181 such as interest charging (riba).182
According to Ze’evi, “conscious of their state’s image as upholder of eternal
justice, heads of the judiciary in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries found ingenious
ways to resolve the differences [between shari’a and kanun].”183 What is important here
is to address the relevancy of the emergence of an imperial learned hierarchy and the
appointment of the official Hanafi madhhab that’s doctrine was so closely regulated by
the state to the legitimacy of the kanun. Those two developments were a product of
sultanic decrees; yet, Ottoman jurists were closely involved in the process of the making
of Ottoman law.184 The emergence of both the learned hierarchy and the kanun were
closely aligned.185 The process of creating an imperial learned hierarchy through the
regulation of a specific curriculum studied at the madrasa and the hierarchy of
genealogies to be sought out as well as defined career and training tracks created a class
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of ulama that became so closely tied to the state. It grew accustomed to the state
intervention and was accepting of state practices. Thus, this “spirit of accommodation”
facilitated the readiness of the learned hierarchy to cooperate with the Ottoman
authorities.186 This was particularly true with the case of the seyhulislam whose role,
alongside that of the fatwa, was detrimental to Ottoman law making and to the religious
legitimacy of both the sultan and the state, especially in the 16th Century.187 Thus, when it
came to validating the authority of the kanun, it was the seyhulislam who the sultan often
turned to in order to issue fatwa that kneaded its permissibility.188 This was especially the
case when it came to extra-shari’a regulations.
It is important to note here that the broader objective of kanun was to standardize
the Ottoman legal system and create a uniform law of procedure that would bring all the
Ottoman provinces in line with one another. It also served as a tool to reassert the power
of the central authority and to regulate the core-periphery relations. However, in doing so,
the kanun was often at odds with the shari’a. Thus, the lines between both were often
blurred; but to only approach both legal systems as either conflicting or not becomes an
overly normative attempt to place the kanun within the confines of the shari’a and not as
a system that developed independently of its own. It is only fitting to treat kanun as a
complex legal system that at times co-existed with the shari’a and at times it did not. At
times it violated it and at times it did not. What must be considered here is not the
division of the literature on this subject, but the efforts and attempts of reconciliation,
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accommodation, and the creation of a “common vocabulary”189 as a form of political
expediency; the innovative policies that were the products of kanun; the restructuring of
the system of administration; and finally the molding of the Ottoman legal system.
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CHAPTER 2: THE AGENCIES OF THE STATE
By outlining the development process of the making of Ottoman law, it becomes less
challenging to develop a canonical framework within which to place the changes that
took place in the Ottoman legal administration. In order to understand the workings of the
Ottoman legal system and to what extent was law applied in practice, it is essential to first
grasp the setup of the Ottoman bureaucratic state. Besides the incorporation of new
frontiers, the Ottoman Empire absorbed a large number of people with different identities
and different backgrounds. With this degree of fluidity and lack of defined boundaries
came new challenges. How was it that the Ottoman state was going to maintain such a
large-scale empire over such a long period of time? The previous chapter was one attempt
to answer this question; that through the development of a more comprehensive code of
law, the Ottomans aimed to achieve standardization and uniformity. But the question that
remains here is by which means did they administer such a state? This chapter aims at
identifying the main constituents of the bureaucratic structure that had the most
substantial impact in the administration of the Ottoman Empire and that were some of its
most important representatives. It will showcase how the bureaucratic setup of the state
was grounded in the concepts of legitimacy and justice and how the more elaborated state
institutions that were developed asserted the legitimation of the Ottoman administration.

I. The Sultan
The role of the sultan in the Ottoman administration served as the basic foundation of the
bureaucratic structure of the state. His capacity as the chief administrator of the empire
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was rooted in his capacity to enforce his rulership.190 The principal function of the sultan
was his leadership in conquest. He used to lead the military campaigns and direct the
strategies in person. This image of warrior-sultan was often celebrated, which was more
of a real rather than a symbolic notion until the predecessors of Sultan Suleyman I
abandoned the practice of leading the military campaigns themselves.191 This in part was
due to the impracticality of the sultan to lead the battlefield with such largely extended
frontiers and the prolonged period of the military campaigns as well as the growing
necessity that called for the presence of the sultan in the imperial capital.192
Moreover, the notion of leadership was also employed when it came to sultanic
claims over rulership. According to the Hanafi doctrine, a leader asserted his legitimacy
when he proved his capacity to seize and exercise power.193 The Ottoman sultans lay
claim to such legitimacy when they proclaimed themselves leaders of the holy wars
waged against the infidels. Thus, the territories conquered from the infidels were
rightfully theirs.194 However, a problem arose when it came to territories usurped from
the Seljuks. To reassert their legitimacy over lands seized from Muslims, they claimed
that the last sultan of the Seljuk dynasty appointed as his successor the first Ottoman
sultan, making the Ottoman dynasty the heirs to Seljuk lands195. However, the wars
waged later against the Mamluks and the Safavids of Iran were a lot less subtle. The
Ottoman sultans thus claimed their leadership as the most powerful defenders of Islam
and shari’a by waging the wars against the infidels and the heretics. This entitlement to
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sovereignty was later much more expanded on with the conquests of the 16th Century led
by Sultan Suleyman I. 196 Those claims were further broadened to include universal
sovereignty of the sultan—which was in itself an Ottoman innovation. It was Ebu’sSu’ud who formulated those claims that gave Sultan Suleyman the prerogatives to
universal sovereignty, which were commemorated in the inscription above the portal of
his mosque.197 Colin Imber quotes this inscription that reads:
“[Sultan Suleyman] has drawn near to [God], the Lord of Majesty and
Omnipotence, / the Creator of the World of Dominion and Sovereignty, /
[Sultan Suleyman] who is His slave, made mighty with Divine Power, /
the Caliph, resplendent with Divine Glory, / Who performs the Command
of the Hidden Book / and executes its Decrees in [all] regions of the
inhabited quarter: / Conqueror of the Lands of the Orient and the Occident
/ with the Help of Almighty God and His Victorious Army, / Possessor of
the Kingdoms of the World, Shadow of God over all Peoples, Sultan of the
Sultans of the Arabs and the Persians, / Promulgator of Sultanic Qanuns, /
Tenth of the Ottoman Khaqans, / Sultan son of the Sultan, Sultan
Suleyman Khan / … / May the line of his Sultanate endure until the End of
the Line of the Ages!/…”198

Those sultanic characteristics and attributes of a sovereign ruler were reassertions that
first and foremost the sultan’s legitimacy to rulership was drawn from the classical notion
of divine right as the sultan came to be considered God’s viceregent on earth who had
rightful claims to universal sovereignty.199 Secondly, they also credited the sultan with
the right to secular sovereignty that he gained through conquests.200 Finally, he was seen
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as the enforcer of the shari’a and kanun, which endowed him with the authority of a
legislator.201
When it came to administering the government, the sultan’s scope of power in
theory was usually limited to four specific areas of legal authority according to Hanafi
theory, which covered “Friday prayer, taxation, the fifth on war booty and the fixed
penalties.”202 However, in practice, the authority that the Ottoman sultan exercised went
beyond the confines of those four spheres. This was in part due to the fact that the sultan
decreed kanuns that dealt with other legal areas such as land, fiscal, and criminal laws.203
In addition to his sultanic decrees, he exercised extra-legal forms of authority that were
meant to ensure the welfare of the public. Friday prayer was one example showing the
tight control of the sultan’s administration. Either the sultan or his delegate would lead
the Friday prayers and the imam or the preacher of the mosques in the towns and cities of
the Ottoman provinces who were appointed by the government exalted the sultan’s name
in their speeches. This further laid claims to the sovereignty of the sultan over his
people.204 Moreover, even in cases where the government-appointed-preacher could not
lead the Friday prayer, it was only through a sultanic decree and a fatwa from Ebu’sSu’ud that authorized the preacher to appoint a deputy to lead the prayers. Another aspect
that showcases the extent of the sultan’s authority was that the Festival and Friday
prayers could only be held in places authorized by the sultan. He did not, for instance,
permit them to be held in villages.205
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One of the basic functions of the Ottoman administration was to accumulate
revenue,206 and this was mostly achieved through taxation. Given the importance of such
function, taxation fell under the jurisdiction of the imperial authority.207 However, the
taxes the sultan obtained often did not correspond with the Hanafi doctrine. This practice
began to pose a problem starting the 15th Century when an Ottoman scholar authored a
treatise declaring the illegality of the revenue raised from customs and land tenure by the
sultan and called for the adherence to the shari’a.208 However, it was Ebu’s-Su’ud who
attempted to reconcile Ottoman taxation practices with the doctrine of the shari’a by
restating some concepts that he borrowed from the Hanafi doctrine.209 Moreover, the
spoils of war was a third area that was considered to be under the sultan’s authority.
According to Hanafi law, the sultan was entitled to the fifth of the war booty and the rest
was to be handed over to individuals after the sultan took his share. This was considered
to be another form of revenue for the sultan and his subjects.210 However, an issue arose
in regards to the legality of the ownership of goods and slaves appropriated from war.
People posed questions asking Ebu’s-Su’ud for the lawfulness of war booty raised from
wars against Muslims or against Christians whom the sultan had formulated treaties with
to which he answers with a reassertion of the sultan’s authority and licit practices and
eliminated any impediments to the appropriation of war booty from such wars.211
The fourth area that was also within the sultan’s control was the fixed penalties
assigned to hudud punishments, which were: “fornication, false accusation of fornication,
206
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wine-drinking, theft, and highway robbery.”212 Those crimes were seen as transgressing
haqq Allah and it was the sultan’s duty to enforce their punishments. However, in reality,
it was only the offence of highway robbery where the fixed penalty was enforced and was
later broadened to include other crimes that were thought to threaten the welfare of
society such as brigandage, which was very common in the countryside.213 When it came
to other crimes that incurred the fixed penalties it was a rather grey area seeing as that
crimes such as fornication and drinking of wine were difficult to prove. Thus, the practice
of executing such penalties fell under the authority of the sultan.214 However, even in
cases where the fixed penalty was not employed, there were other forms of deterrence
that came to form a symbolic element of the sultan’s administration of criminal acts.
Right before leading his military campaigns, the sultan often issued decrees for the
closure of wine-shops. Such act was believed could evoke divine assistance during the
war.215 What is more interesting is that during the reign of Sultan Suleyman I, coffeeshops, like wine-shops, were also banned. Coffee was believed to be an intoxicant that
posed dangers for the public order and threatened the morality of the society.216 There
was a fatwa issued by Ebu’s-Su’ud regarding this issue, stating that: “How can anyone
consume this reprehensible [substance], which dissolute men drink when engaged in
games and debauchery?”217
This establishes the fact that religion played an important role in the authority and
legitimacy of the sultan. Besides the exercise of coercive measures demonstrated in the
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sultan’s military campaigns and conquests, religion also served as a tool of power
assertion whereas the sultan could not effectively guarantee his legitimacy without
maintaining a religious image, even if it was only symbolic. It was in part through
religion that a sultan could gain the acceptance and the obedience of his people,
especially with a population whom the majority of were Muslims.218 Thus, religion came
to form an important feature in the sultan’s administration. As seen earlier, the sultan’s
claims to legitimacy rested above all on rulership through divine right. Religion was a
central aspect in the relationship between the sultan and his subjects. Hakan T. Karateke
contends that people wished to view their sultan as religious even if they themselves were
not, seeing as that “the subject saw the ruler as a kind of intermediary between God and
himself, facilitating the achievement of his own ambitions.”219 This in turn could benefit
the sultan in terms of securing the subservience of his people.220 However, according to
Karateke, it was insufficient for a ruler to only possess religious attributes, but for his rule
to also be portrayed as such.221 This meant that it was important to have institutions and
certain acts that backed up the sultan’s religiosity.222 One aspect of this was the sultan’s
efforts—especially those of Sultan Suleyman I—to reconcile the kanun with the shari’a;
the aim to amalgamate the administrative laws with the religious laws were seen as
attempts that to an extent grounded the religious legitimacy of the sultan.223 It was also
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under Sultan Suleyman I that the religious institutions reached their most developed
stage.224
There were other attempts to advocate the religiosity of the sultan to the public.
The sultan’s leadership in waging holy wars against infidels was one angle of the
religious rhetoric. Another way of promoting the sultan’s religious character was his
procession to Friday prayers and the order of transporting holy relics from Mecca to the
capital. There were other such deeds that portrayed this image of the sultan. However,
one of the most significant measures taken to retain his religious figure was gaining the
title of “servitor of the two Holy Sanctuaries”—hadim al-haramayn—after the conquests
of the Arab provinces of 1516-17.225 Sultan Selim I had thus embraced this Mamluk title
after the conquests, which changed the religious identity of the Ottoman sultan.226 Inspite
of the fact that no Ottoman sultan actually ever went to Mecca,227 yet the title gave them
prestige among the Muslim community and further heightened the legitimacy of their
rulership as the “rightful leaders of the Hijaz.”228 Nonetheless, those rights also charged
them with a magnitude of services that they had to maintain. They became involved with
the maintenance of buildings and holy sites as well as the restoration of the Holy Mosque
in Mecca.229 The most important of those services, however, was securing the caravans of
pilgrims heading to Mecca from robbers and Bedouins and supplying them with other
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essentials. En route to the Hijaz, water fountains were built, Bedouins who were in
control of springs were paid off, and food was subsidized during the pilgrimage and when
the pilgrims reached the Hijaz.230 However costly was the maintenance of such duties, the
extent of this religious authority was of great significance to the “imperial ideology” and
to the image that the sultan retained as leader and Caliph of the Muslim community.231 It
further aided in the unity of the old and new territories of the empire under the religious
zeal of the sultan.232

The Image of Justice
Justice formed yet another constitutive rhetoric of the sultan’s sovereignty over his
subjects. The classical notion of justice was retained in the age of the Ottoman sultans.
They regarded themselves as “guardians of God’s country against oppression and
tyranny…and dispensers of justice.”233 This image of the sultan as a just ruler came to
form a very crucial element in his administration both in terms of legitimacy and as
protector of the people against injustices. The sovereignty bestowed upon him entitled
him to rule justly and enact laws that would ensure the fair administration of justice.234
Anything else that exhausts the enforcement of just laws would impair his sovereignty.
With such great emphasis placed on retaining justice, the sultan went through great
measures to ensure that his administration was structured in such a way that would secure
that justice was fairly dispensed.235 One of the main functions of a just ruler was to
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protect his people against the abuse caused by his executive authorities. Thus, he was
regarded as a sort of “safe-keeping” “supreme power” that safeguarded his people against
the exploitative actions of his officials.236 Moreover, the sultan regulated justice through
his civil and religious administrations. His two executive officials responsible for the two
administrations were his grand Vizier and seyhulislam. They were the two main
representatives of the sultan’s civil and religious authorities and would ensure that the
sultan’s just rule was effectively implemented.237 Furthermore, the sultan would enact
edicts called adalet-names that served as a reminder for his executive officials to not
commit any acts of injustices against the public.238 There was also an established network
of agents who were dispersed amongst the public to monitor acts of injustices. The sultan
himself would at times go undercover on secret tours to reveal any abuses taking place.239
Earlier on during the reign of the Abbasids, the Caliph did not exercise the right
of legislating outside the confines of the shari’a. Even when he did enact laws, he coined
them as a form of administration rather than legislation that served the purposes of the
shari’a.240 The Ottoman sultans on the other hand were a lot less subtle in their process of
legislation. However, there were greater attempts made in harmonizing the kanun with
the shari’a, even when the administrative laws were clearly outside the bounds of the
shari’a.241 This was particularly true in the reign of Sultan Suleyman I. He was the most
celebrated sultan as the upholder of justice. He was glorified as the legislator (al-Kanuni)
for championing the kanun and for his keenness in asserting the supremacy of the law as
236
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well as for creating the most comprehensive kanunname. 242 With more laws being
legislated, there were greater measures taken to maintain that the main aims of such
legislations were the welfare of the public and to protect the people against injustices
caused by executive officials or judges.243 This was one way of strengthening the sultan’s
centralistic hold and establishing a bureaucracy that ensured standardization and
uniformity throughout the empire. With more considerable endeavors set forth by Sultan
Suleyman I in establishing the authority of the law, he came to be considered as the
embodiment of justice and as a “law-abiding ruler.”244
Furthermore, Sultan Suleyman undertook a series of actions when he first
ascended the throne that was aimed at securing the welfare of his subjects. He freed
deportees who were forcefully brought to the capital by his father Sultan Selim I.245 He
returned the silk goods seized from Iranian and Ottoman merchants after Sultan Selim I
had issued a ban on them. He also ordered the execution of certain officials who served
under the reign of his predecessor and who were known to having committed injustices
against the people and other such acts that underpinned “his time of justice.”246 Those
efforts further idealized Sultan Suleyman I’s achievements in creating a centralistic
administration and were enough reason for his reign to be reckoned as the empire’s
Golden Age.247 In 1595, Sultan Mehmed III proclaimed that, “formerly Sultan Suleyman
Khan—may God place him in the highest if the paradises—in his days of justice
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enforcement had imperial codes (Kanunnames) written and placed in the courts of the
kadis, and since they had compiled with its content, no one suffered injustice and
oppression and everything was taken care of the best way, and the subjects who are a
trust by God lived in peace and prosperity.”248 To what extent this was true is a point of
contention; however, it aids to demonstrate how Sultan Suleyman I was celebrated as a
just ruler.
Fratricide and Siyaset Punishments
Even though there was a lot of emphasis placed on retaining the image of the sultan as a
just ruler and there were times where people turned to the bureaucratic state as the
dispenser of justice where authorities ensured the removal of corrupt officials who had
committed offenses against the state’s subjects, there are also a number of events in the
history of Ottoman sultans that call this rhetoric of justice into question. It is argued that
even though the sultan served as the legislator and promulgator of the law, he was not
confined by the law and was himself above it.249 Thus, it is interesting to see how the
sultan dealt with challenges that threatened his authority, which could also serve as a way
to demonstrate the extent of power he exercised in maintaining his absolute rule.
The challenges to the throne often emanated from within the imperial family, the
administrative officials, and even from the provinces. However, it was from within the
dynasty that the sultan felt most threatened.250 Thus, to limit the extent of the dynastic
threats to the sultan’s rule, there were two clear-cut laws that regulated the succession to
the throne; the ineligibility of females to ascend the throne, and that rulership was

248

Inalcik, “State, Sovereignty and Law,” p.76
Heyd, Studies in old Ottoman Criminal Law, p. 193.
250
Imber, Ebu’s-Su’ud, p. 207.
249

57

patrilineal, meaning that only the sultan’s sons were entitled to the throne. This patrilineal
method of succession went into practice starting from 1450 and up to 1595.251 However,
there were no laws regulating which son entertained the right of succession. This
eventually led to civil wars breaking out and the onset of the practice of fratricide252
between brothers over who was to succeed the father.253 There are numerous examples of
fratricide committed within the Ottoman dynasty to eliminate any threats to their
sovereignty. Sultan Mehmed I (1413-1421) believed to have said when criticized over
executing his brothers that, “in sovereignty, Ottoman rulers have let experience be their
guide and therefore do not accept partnership in rule.”254 This practice became a custom
whereas Sultan Mehmed II also executed the only brother who survived as soon as he
ascended the throne. Sultan Bayzeid II remained restless during his reign until the death
of his brother Cem and his sons. However, eventually, it was his own son Sultan Selim I
who overthrew him in 1512 after he eliminated any rivalry to the throne by killing his
two brothers and one of his brothers’ sons.255 Sultan Suleyman I’s succession was a
smoother one seeing as that he had no brothers. However, the predicament of whom of
his sons was to succeed him started early on before Sultan Suleyman I’s death. The
rivalry between his two sons, Selim and Bayzeid, eventually led to Bayzeid escaping to
Iran, and with the support of Sultan Suleyman I himself, Selim II ascended the throne. In
due course, after striking a treaty with the Safavid shah of Iran, executioners were sent by
Sultan Suleyman to execute Prince Bayzeid.256
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However, it was the last sultan of the 16th Century practice of fratricide that
caused a public outrcry. After the death of Sultan Selim II in 1574, his only son Murad III
succeeded him with no bloodshed, but later executed his four young brothers after he
ascended the throne. It was his son and successor Sultan Mehmed III in 1595 who
appallingly executed his nineteen infant brothers as soon as he became sultan.257 Imber
maintains that, “it seems to have been public revulsion at the slaughter of princes [by
Mehmed III] who put an end to the custom of fratricide and to have initiated the practice
of secluding princes so that they could not present a danger to the reigning sultan.”258
However, it was Sultan Mehmed II’s provision in his kanunname statute, which legalized
the execution of male relatives on the basis that “most of the ulama have declared this
lawful”259 and for the purpose of fending off any chance of civil war as well as carrying
out such practice “for the sake of the order of the world.”260 It served to legitimize the
practice of fratricide but did not seem to work well in appeasing the public during the
reign of Mehmed III, thus putting an end to the practice.261 Yet, challenges to the throne
did not only stem from brothers, but also from other members of the sultan’s family or
even his executive officials. Sultan Suleyman I, for instance, executed his own son
Mustafa in 1553 out of fear of being dethroned by him.262 Moreover, the execution of his
grand Vizier Ibrahim Paşa also serves as an interesting example of the sultan’s absolute
rule and the extent of his authority.263
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Celâlzâde Mustafa, who served as nişancı (1534-1556) and who authored
Tabakâtü'l-Memâlik ve Derecâtü'l-Mesâlik that contributed to the idealization of the
reign of Sultan Suleyman I, best described how justice was perceived during his time.264
He argued that justice rested on “the absolute rule of the sultan.”265 The sultan was
regarded as the only one who possessed the capability of carrying the “heavy burden” of
sovereignty. The leadership that he was endowed with by God enabled him to administer
justice even in cases that could not be conclusively proven. 266 Yilmaz contends that, in
accordance with Celâlzâde, “the sultan’s very existence serves the welfare of society due
to the stability ensured by a powerful political authority.”267 It is this line of reasoning
and this perception of justice that was utilized in the liquidation of threats that challenged
the sultan’s absolute rule.
One way that the sultans ensured the loyalty of their ministers was through
marriage. Establishing foreign allegiances through marriage was abandoned in 1450 for
the practice of marrying off Ottoman princesses to members of the sultan’s
administration. 268 This grew to become a tradition where the Ottoman sultan often
married off his sister or his daughter to his grand Vizier so he would be bound to the
dynasty in such a way that would eliminate any possibility of rebellion.269 However, this
practice was proven not to be a real guarantee. Sultan Suleyman I’s grand Vizier Ibrahim
Paşa (1523-1536) gained more eminence and power by marrying the sultan’s sister in
1524.270 He was favored by Sultan Suleyman and was appointed as grand Vizier against
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all odds seeing as that he had no history or knowledge in governance.271 The sultan had
ignored appointing the candidate to the Vizierate Ahmed Paşa —contrary to the
traditional practice—and sent him off to become governor of Egypt.272 Ibrahim Paşa was
considered a very powerful Vizier who the sultan deemed as his “alter ego” in matters of
administration.273 Celâlzâde described him as a virtuous person who held high integrity
and who was keen to observe justice. However, Celâlzâde argued that the character of
Ibrahim Paşa had changed immensely when he gained more power and prestige after
leading the conquest of Tabriz in Iran.274 He began to listen to “dishonest and inferior
people,” whom one of them had seduced him into using the title of sultan seeing as that
he made a great ruler. Thus, Ibrahim Paşa took up the title of “serasker sultan.”275
Accordingly, when Sultan Suleyman I heard of Ibrahim Paşa’s undertakings, he ordered
his execution siyaseten in 1537.276
Celâlzâde alleged that the execution of Ibrahim Paşa was in part due to the fact
that the sultan was displeased with Ibrahim Paşa’s conquest of Tabriz. Moreover, he
rested the justification of his execution on that the grand Vizier had become “a source of
injustice” who disregarded the laws and traditions.277 However, it is safe to conclude that
the actions of Ibrahim Paşa’s threatened the dynastic interests of Sultan Suleyman I and
acted as a contender for his absolute authority. Another line of argument is that Sultan
Suleyman’s wife Hürrem and daughter Mihrimah had driven the sultan to execute
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Ibrahim Paşa and his sons from other women, Mustafa and Bayzeid by “[tampering] with
[the sultan’s] sentiments.”278 It is interesting to note that Mihrimah’s husband, Rustem
Paşa, had later become grand Vizier (1549-53; 1555-62).279
Siyaset punishments were not restricted to the execution of the sultan’s sons or his
officials only. Celâlzâde recalls in his Tabakât other incidents besides Ibrahim Paşa’s
where the sultan ordered executions siyaseten; one such case, as Heyd puts it, is as
follows:
“In 1528 the house of a Muslim in Istanbul was attacked at night by
unknown persons, all its inhabitants were killed and its contents were
looted or destroyed. The perpetrators were not found, but suspicion,
supported by certain ‘indications’, fell on a certain group of non-Muslim
vagrants (levend) who in the past had been repeatedly suspected of, or
charged with, similar crimes. Thereupon about eight hundred such people
were rounded up in the markets, taverns, etc. and publicly executed
siyaseten.”280
What is more fascinating about this case is the justification Celâlzâde gave for such an
incident. He argued, gruesome as it was and despite the innocence of most of the people
executed, this incident prompted fear in the wrongdoers and deterred any such future
actions from taking place.281 The sultan’s wide discretion of siyaset punishments—a
principle that found its way into the kanun—to deal with injustices that threatened the
public order and welfare of society was regarded as a necessity. Even if, it is argued, the
sultan transcends the boundaries set forth by the shari’a, it is justified on the basis of
order and stability.282 Upon reflecting on the case of the Istanbul executions, an Ottoman
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scholar in the 17th Century contends that “the very existence of the realm…depends on
the threat of the Sultan’s punishment (siyaset), and public order would break down if the
people did not live ‘between fear and hope.’”283 Even when it came to executing his son
Bayzeid, Sultan Suleyman I used the notion of law and order as a point of departure in
carrying out the siyaset punishment seeing as that his son was “a rebel who caused
bloodshed among innocent people,” and it was the sultan’s responsibility as a just ruler
and protector of the people to get rid of anyone who threatened his subjects.284

II. The Imperial Divan (Divan-ı Hümâyûn)
The Ottoman government’s most fundamental obligation was the administration of
justice and the sultan’s duty was to ensure that it was being fairly dispensed. 285 Even
though he represented the main judicial authority and aimed at retaining his image as a
just ruler, the sultan did not always administer justice himself and extended his authority
to other formal organs of the state and to his executive officials. 286 The imperial divan,
under the presidency of the grand Vizier, was one such organ that served as a cabinet that
was in charge of the governmental affairs and also acted as a high court that was
responsible for administering justice. 287 In spite of exercising authority that was
subservient to that of the sultan’s, the divan still represented the extent of the deepening
of the bureaucratic organization and the centralization of the state.288 Moreover, being at
the helm of the state’s administration and its enforcement of justice, the divan came to
283
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designate an integral part of the legal administration of the Ottoman Empire in the early
period. It is thus important to understand the setup of such a structural institution, how it
developed over the early period of the Ottoman Empire, and how it also came to signify
part of the core-periphery relations.
The institution serving as a high court existed well before the Ottoman Empire
with similar practices that were later implemented by the Ottoman authorities. Some of
the purposes of previous divans were to establish justice, prosecute officials who
transgressed the rights of the subjects, and to act as an appeal court for petitions and
complaints submitted by the subjects.289 The pre-Ottoman divan bore different functions
and structural forms that were in one way or another similar to that of the Ottomans’.290
However, the Imperial divan, serving as a continuation of the system of previous
institutions of divans, witnessed a series of developments and changes to its structure and
functions over the 15th and 16th Centuries, which made it a lot more grounded in the
bureaucratic makeup of the Ottoman state.291
In the early Ottoman period, the divan functioned as an institution that dealt with
less pivotal and administrative matters on behalf of the sultan.292 In spite of the fact that
the kanun was in origin based on the will of the sultan, notable officials in the divan—the
grand vizier or the nişancı—at times issued edicts on the authority of the sultan or offered
suggestions to the sultan in regards to the enactment of certain decrees.293 Thus, the divan
had maintained part of the process of legislation. Moreover, initially, besides acting as a
289
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court where the state’s subjects could submit their complaints and lawsuits, the divan had
also acted as the sultan’s advisory divan in matters regarding political or military
decisions.294 Following the Seljuk tradition of presiding over the divan himself and
dispensing justice,295 the sultan, as described by an Egyptian chronicler during the reign
of Bayzeid I (1389-1402), “would sit early in the morning on a broad eminence with the
people standing away from him at a distance where he could see them. If anyone had
suffered an injustice, he would submit it to him, and he would remove it.”296 Despite the
informality of the sultan’s administration of justice, there was a lot of emphasis that was
placed in the early 15th century on the importance of the sultan appearing in public before
his people and presiding over the divan himself. An interesting story that depicts the
importance of such an event as retold by Imber, reads as follows:
“When [Mehmed I (1413-21)] died, the [Viziers] sought to conceal the fact
until the arrival of his elder son, Murad, to take the throne. They continued
to hold a divan every day at the Sultan’s ‘Gate’—presumably in the Palace
at Edirne—‘giving out governorships and fiefs and seeing to affairs.’
However, when a group of soldiers threatened rebellion because they had
not seen the sultan, the [Viziers] brought the corpse to the gate, with a lad
behind to move its arms, so that it would appear as if the sultan were alive
and stroking his beard.”

Pal Fodor holds that the two separate functions of the sultan administering justice and the
grand Vizier and other members acting as an informal advisory divan for decision-making
were retained by two separate organs.297 The first witnessed the informal process of the
sultan dispensing justice out in the open in the 14th and early 15th Century, while the
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second “attended to political and governmental issues, giving counsel and making
arrangements for the sultan’s decisions.”298 However, with Murad II delegating the task
of administering justice to the kadi-‘asker in the 15th Century,299 and Mehmed II later
abandoning the tradition of presiding over the divan himself and delegating its presidency
to the grand Vizier,300 a “Great Divan” had begun to develop into a formal organ of
governance that acted on behalf of the sultan and that unified the different functions
carried out by the sultan and members of the divan.301 However, even though the grand
Vizier had assumed the role of the sultan in presiding over the divan, this did not
necessarily entail that the sultan was unaware of what happened within the divan. First
off, it was the grand Vizier’s duty to inform the sultan with all the discussions and
deliberations that took place after the divan meetings were held.302 Secondly, the sultan
had a “small square window” overlooking the divan chamber to listen to what took place
during the sessions without being seen.303 Thus, the members of the divan were always
aware of the possibility of the sultan listening in on the divan proceedings; hence,
members could not conceal from the sultan whatever discussions unfolded.304 Some
attribute the creation of the window to Mehmed II while others credit it to Suleyman I.305
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Nonetheless, references show that the sultans continued to watch over the divan chamber
through the window well into the 17th Century.306
Structure and Membership of the Imperial Divan
By the reign of Mehmed II, the main posts and functions of the members of the divan had
already been established. The number of members had largely increased over the years;
however, the functions of the most important members had remained intact. 307
Membership of the divan consisted of the Viziers, the military judges (kadi-‘asker), the
treasurers (defterdar), and the nişancı. Besides dealing with the military and political
affairs of the divan, the Viziers also took part in the military campaigns under the
authority of the sultan or another commander higher in rank. The kadi-’askers—who sat
beside the Viziers and were permanent members of the divan—were the chief judges
responsible for the judicial affairs of the divan. The defterdar was in charge of the
financial department, while the nişancı was the affixer of the sultan’s tuğrâ and ensured
the authentication of documents and decrees. The former two sat below the Viziers and
kadi-‘askers.308
Initially, there were three Viziers who were members of the divan in early 15th
Century. This continued to be the case until the number increased to four in mid-16th
Century, and to eleven by the 17th Century.309 However, it is difficult to tell who were the
full-time members seeing as that during the 17th Century, Viziers were ordinarily
dispatched to serve in the provinces.310 The creation of the position of kadi-‘asker dates
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back to the time of Murad I. There had been a single kadi-‘asker until towards the end of
Mehmed II’s reign when grand Vizier Mehmed Paşa of Karaman created the post of a
second kadi-‘asker—who became the Kadi-‘asker of Rumelia—to counteract the
authority of the other kadi-‘asker—who was promoted to the post of Kadi-‘asker of
Anatolia.311 The number of defterdars had also increased over the years to four by the
end of 16th Century. This is argued to be due to the fact that there were growing financial
pressures merited by deficits in revenue because of inflation and unprofitable military
conquests. Moreover, there are no references that indicate that there was more than one
nişancı—a post which is believed to date back as early as the 15th Century.312 Those four
senior posts came to represent the different domains of the empire: “the political, judicial,
and financial.”

313

Those three realms represented the sultan’s administration.

Furthermore, despite the earlier interchanges that took place between the different
posts—where a kadi-‘asker could become Vizier or a nişancı a grand Vizier—this
changed by the 16th Century where each post became exclusive with specified functions
and careers.314 However, even though the posts had taken a more designated form by the
16th Century, the division of tasks goes back to the kanunname of Mehmed II where it
detailed the jurisdiction of authority of the four leading members of the divan.315 The
degree of power that each member exercised did not necessarily entail the sovereignty of
decisions. The grand Vizier, for instance, could not issue financial decisions without the
knowledge of the defterdar. Thus, there had to be coordination in the decision-making
process between members of the divan and opinions of executive members could not be
311
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overlooked, not even by the grand Vizier himself. In all probability, this was meant to
balance out the power between members in the divan.316
Besides the four executive members, there were others who, by the 16th Century,
also occasionally sat in the divan. Some of who were the commander-in-chief
(beglerbégi) of Rumelia, the grand-admiral, and the ağa of the Janissaries. 317
Additionally, there was an increase in the number of clerks by the 16th Century who
served under each domain represented in the divan who were responsible for
administrative work. By 1627-8, the number of clerks amounted to 115.318 Furthermore,
it is noteworthy here that despite of the significant position he employed in the state’s
administration, which became also significantly higher in rank than that of the kadi‘asker,319 the seyhulislam did not sit in the Imperial Divan.320 This was different from
other previous divans in Muslim states and the Mamluk Dar al-‘Adl where there was a
seat dedicated to the mufti.321 However, the seyhulislam was at times requested to appear
before the divan for advice in regards to certain cases.322 In the renowned case of the
heretic Molla Kabız in 1527—who had preached the superiority of Jesus over
Muhammad and other controversial doctrines—the grand Vizier Ibrahim Paşa turned the
case over to the kadi-‘askers of Rumelia and Anatolia.323 However, Celâlzâde Mustafa
argued that given their lack of knowledge on matters regarding the shari’a, the kadi‘askers failed to refute the arguments of Kabız who had cited verses from the Koran and
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hadith; thus, they “could find nothing to say save hakamtu bi-kathlihi [‘I sentence him to
death’].”324 Seeing as that Ibrahim Paşa believed that the case required to be dealt with in
accordance with the shari’a and not ‘urf as well as the inability of the kadi-‘askers to
make sound religious counter arguments, the grand Vizier set Kabız free from the divan.
However, Sultan Suleyman I, who had been listening to the case through the window
overlooking the divan chamber, decided that there were other competent men in the
religious fields and requested the presence of the seyhulislam Kemalpaşazade and the
qadi of Istanbul Sa’di Çelebi to reexamine the case before the divan.325 In the course of
the retrial, the seyhulislam refuted Kabız’s heretical arguments intelligibly and asked him
if he wished to renounce them. When he rejected, the seyhulislam turned the case over to
the qadi to give his sentence, who in turn again asked Kabız to renounce his beliefs.
When he refused once more, he was sentenced to death.326
Seeing the importance and weight given to the opinion and legal advice of
seyhulislam, the question remains of why he did not have a seat in the divan. One
argument holds that there was a growing need to create a religious figure who would act
as a symbol of the shari’a and who would hold a character that was markedly distinct
from the government’s secular character. 327 The imperial divan was seen as the
embodiment of that secular government, and there was desire to protect the seyhulislam
from the “taint of secularism.”328 Another argument maintains the inferiority of the office
of seyhulislam in the 15th Century on the grounds that the kadi-‘asker’s salary exceeded
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that of the seyhulislam’s. However, it is again argued that the “lowness” of his salary was
also due to the desire to protect him from the “accusation of worldliness.”329
The leading officeholder of the sultan’s administration was the grand Vizier. He
was considered as the second in command after the sultan,330 and as mentioned earlier,
his “alter ego.”331 In the kanunname of Mehmed II, the grand Vizier’s status was closely
described as follows: “Know that the grand Vizier is, above all, the head of the Viziers
and commanders. He is greater than all men; he is in all matters the sultan’s absolute
deputy. The defterdar is deputy of the Treasury but under the supervision of the grand
Vizier. In all meetings and in all ceremonies the grand Vizier takes his place before all
others.”332 With this extent of power vested in him, some could argue that the grand
Vizier ran the empire for the sultan. Bearing this kind of prestige and high rank, no other
officeholder could question or restrict the authority of the grand Vizier.333 He was the
sultan’s confidant who was contended to be the only one aware of the state of affairs and
no one could interfere between him and the sultan in regards to their secret dealings and
decisions. 334 He reached a power height where he could take decisions and make
appointments or dismissals without the sultan’s approval.335 Furthermore, serving as the
“military commander and the sultan’s absolute deputy in civil administration” was
something that was unprecedented in Muslim states and a novel form of authority that the
grand Vizier began to exercise under the reign of Murad I.336 With such great power and
authority entrusted to the grand Vizier, out of fear of rivalry, Mehmed II began the
329
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traditional practice of appointing a grand Vizier who was an offspring of peasants and did
not come from dynastic lineage as earlier grand Viziers did.337 Moreover, attending to the
presidency of the divan, the grand Vizier had a multitude of functions. His chief
responsibilities were to maintain social and political order, hear out petitions, and
administer justice.338 He also exercised the right of supervision of all governmental
departments and it had become the custom that decisions issued by the grand Vizier in the
divan could not be turned down by the sultan.339 Almost all matters had to go through the
grand Vizier first for confirmation, even orders passed by the sultan.340 Thus, in large, the
grand Vizier came to constitute an important element in the policy-making process and
administration of the Ottoman Empire.
Despite exercising such a vast authority, the grand Vizier’s power was not
unlimited. Even though he possessed the authority of taking decisions without consulting
the sultan at times, the grand Vizier still had to consult with other members of the divan
before issuing important rulings. One of the reasons for the execution of Ibrahim Paşa
was that he ceased to consult other members. Moreover, there were a number of grand
Viziers who were executed other than Ibrahim Paşa for threatening the absolute power of
the sultan.341 The appointment of other members was at times meant to curb the powers
of the grand Vizier. The nomination of the chief defterdar under the reign of Murad III
was one such example. Furthermore, the leading officeholders of the financial and
judicial departments of the government were appointed by the sultan and were the
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absolute representatives of their own domains.342 With such division of functions in the
state’s administration, the power of the grand Vizier could not have been absolutely
unrestricted. Additionally, the apparatus of the divan was meant to promote the various
opinions of its members, which also acted as a form of power check to balance out the
degree of authority exercised by each member.
Furthermore, according to Inalcik, “the ulema represented the greatest power
within the state independent of the grand Vizier.”343 The appointment of qadis and other
religious figures fell under the jurisdiction of the kadi-‘askers and not the grand Vizier.
Moreover, the seyhulislam—despite not being a member of the divan—at times acted as
the grand Vizier’s adversary. Exercising control over the judiciary and the appointments
or dismissals of qadis in important provinces, the seyhulislam embodied a degree of
authority that served to counteract that of the grand Vizier’s.344 An event that took place
between Muhyiddin Çelebi 345 and Ibrahim Paşa—one of the most powerful grand
Viziers—serves as an interesting example that showcases the degree of enmity that at
times existed between the two. One day, when Muhyiddin Çelebi heard a case in the
divan to give his opinion but chose to delay the judgment on the grounds of wanting to
establish all the facts of the case, Ibrahim Paşa in turn argued that there was no reason for
delay given his previous knowledge of the case as he “bore witness to it…and [believed]
that the truth was clear.” To Ibrahim Paşa’s surprise, Muhyiddin Çelebi response was that
the grand Vizier’s statement was inadmissible in accordance with the shari’a, seeing as
342
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that Ibrahim Paşa was “an unmanumitted346 slave.”347 When Ibrahim Paşa complained to
Suleyman I about how Muhyiddin Çelebi humiliated him, Suleyman responded that the
seyhulislam was “a speaker of the truth, firm in the faith.” Thus, the sultan could not
interfere with his judgments, but also that Ibrahim Paşa was indeed a freed slave.
However, when Ibrahim Paşa went back to Muhyiddin Çelebi demanding that he
considers his testimony as admissible, the seyhulsilam still did not take his word for it
and demanded that the sultan confirmed it. Adding to the grand Vizier’s humiliation, the
seyhulislam got hold of the document of manumission from the sultan that Ibrahim Paşa
was indeed a freed slave and presented it to the grand Vizier before members of the divan,
stating that he could now accept his testimony. This is a compelling example that
showcases that despite the grandeur and prestige the grand Vizier possessed, his power
was not absolute and could be threatened by other representatives of the sultan.
Moreover, even though the grand Vizier was the “absolute deputy” and second man in
command after the sultan, this did not necessarily mean that the sultan always sided with
him. It also shows the strength of authority and status that the seyhulislam came to
represent by the 16th Century.
The Functions of the Imperial Divan and the Institution of Petitioning
Members of the divan, under the leadership of the grand Vizier, met four times a week to
discuss military, administrative, political, and financial issues. 348 However, it is
significant here to examine how the imperial divan functioned as the empire’s supreme
court of justice. In the Seljuk and Mamluk traditions, complaints bearing an
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administrative nature were handed over to members of the divan, while complaints that
fell within the jurisdiction of the shari’a were dealt with in the qadi courts.349 Here, the
Ottoman practice differs from previous practices. The grand Vizier exercised the
authority of giving sentences in all matters in accordance to both the shari’a and the
kanun.350 At times, the grand Vizier extended his authority to pass sentences to the two
kadi-‘askers if the cases were too many.351 Moreover, the imperial divan dealt with the
least to the most important cases. What differentiates the imperial divan as a court of
justice from other shari’a courts is that specific cases could only be brought before the
divan and not the qadi’s court. Only the divan could deal with cases that were politically
sensitive352 or cases with claims that exceeded a stipulated amount of money.353 Qadis,
members of the imperial learned hierarchy,354 foreigners,355 members of the military
class,356 or members of the sultan’s administration could only be tried before the divan.
Moreover, there were certain cases of non-Muslims that could not be dealt with by the
qadi courts and had to appear before the divan. Such cases included the accusations
brought against the Jews of ritual murders, heresy, apostasy of Muslims, and other cases
that also included the Christian community. 357 In the cases regarding non-Muslim
foreigners, the treaty of Capitulations of 1535 between the Ottoman Empire and France
dictated that a French consul or ambassador would be the one who tries French
349
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subjects. 358 However, if a foreign subject was tried before the divan, a diplomatic
representative had to be present.359
A principle that the Ottoman divan held in common with the earlier mazalim
courts was that anyone could bring his case before the divan or submit his grievance in
form of a petition, no matter how minor.360 The divan had thus begun to function as a
mechanism of justice that served as a platform for public audience.361 Members of the
divan often met to hear out the grievances of the people and rectify the injustices caused
against them.362 The state’s subjects utilized this institution of petitioning to complain
against the abuses committed by other individuals, executive officials, tax collectors,
qadis, or governors.363 In theory, the petitions were addressed to the sultan. However, in
reality, they were dealt with by the imperial divan as a whole on behalf of the sultan or by
the grand Vizier in his place of residence.364 Petitions were submitted by either sending a
courier to Istanbul or through a qadi who would draw up a letter of grievance to the
sultan.365 In case the dispute was urgent, the qadi would send a spokesman to Istanbul. In
some instances, the plaintiff or petitioner would submit the case himself before the
divan.366 This system of appeal or petitioning was one of the vital functions of the
imperial divan and there was a lot of emphasis that was placed on it.367 As mentioned

358

Heyd, Old Ottoman Criminal Law, p. 223.
Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law, p. 78.
360
Heyd, Old Ottoman Criminal Law, p. 226 and Rapoport, “Royal Justice and Religious Law,” p. 81, 85;
see also Inalcik, “State, Sovereignty and Law,” p. 61.
361
Pal. “Sultan, Imperial Divan, Grand Vizier,” p. 71.
362
Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, p. 89.
363
Baldwin, James. “Petitioning the Sultan in Ottoman Egypt.” School of Oriental and African Studies,
Bulletin of SOAS, 75, 3 (2012), p. 499; Inalcik, “State, Sovereignty and Law,” p. 61; Inalcik, The Ottoman
Empire: The Classical Age, p. 91.
364
Baldwin, “Petitioning the Sultan in Ottoman Egypt,” p. 510 and Imber, “Government, Administration
and Law,” p. 225.
365
Baldwin, “Petitioning the Sultan in Ottoman Egypt,” p. 511.
366
Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, p. 91.
367
Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, p. 91.
359

76

earlier, there was the idealized image of the sultan personally listening to his subjects’
grievances and publicly dispensing justice; however, over the centuries, the institution of
petitioning grew more and more bureaucratized with a specific process of petitioning and
a record-keeping system. 368 By the 17th Century, there was an archival register—
Registers of Complaints (Şikayet Defterleri)—that was dedicated to recording copies of
the divan’s responses to petitions and other imperial matters. It is argued that the
emphasis on creating such a bureaucratic system for petitioning was a response to the
growing number of petitions submitted to the divan over the years and the growing
likelihood of the palace to be more attentive to the grievances of the public. However,
what is mostly made available is the end process of responding to petitions, and not the
course of action that was taken to produce a response. Some petitions survive in the
Department of Complaints (Şikayet Kalemi), which was created in the 18th Century as a
more improved record-keeping system of the divan’s responses to petitions and the
further emphasis that was placed on their importance.
Those bureaucratic reforms, serving as one of the main functions of the imperial
divan, showcase a momentous aspect of the core-periphery relations: how the state,
through undertaking such measures to create such a system, became more engaged in the
social scene, as well as how the public began to view the government. It could be
contended here that the subjects regarded petitioning the divan as a system that could
yield results and have an impact in changing a given situation, no matter how trivial.369
The question that remains here is why, given the increase in the number of shari’a courts
368
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throughout the provinces of the Ottoman Empire, some chose to turn to petitioning the
divan rather than appealing before the local qadi, even though “sending a petition to
Istanbul would have involved significant investment of money and time.”370 Moreover, in
some cases, the divan referred the case to the provincial qadi or governor.371 One angle
that could be considered here is that in some cases the petition was an appeal against a
sentence passed by a qadi. Peters contends that, despite the lack of an official system of
appeal having existed in the Ottoman legal administration, there was still room for capital
punishments to be reevaluated by the sultan or the divan if a petition is submitted before
the sentence is administered.372 A firman is thus issued in case the appeal is accepted,
delegating an investigator to review the case and request a retrial or pass a new sentence.
The qadi’s or governor’s sentence could be revoked on the grounds that either the official
accepted a bribe to inflict a certain sentence or the sentence was passed on the basis of a
false testimony.373 In other cases, a lawsuit or a petition was sent to the same court for a
retrial or to another court in the same district if the appeal made was against the local
qadi.374 Another possible reason for why people chose to go through the trouble of
petitioning the divan was that the divan’s response to the petition often gave specific
instructions for the qadi to follow and had the ability to largely impact a trial before the
local court.375 A third reason that James Baldwin advances here is that many petitioners
aimed at collecting a large number of authoritative documents to strengthen their
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position. Thus, they would obtain a fatwa, register their case in a shari’a court, acquire a
decree issued by the divan, or secure an order by the local governor.376
However, though anyone could bring his case before the divan, the fact that the
process of petitioning required not only time and effort but also money meant that there
was a degree of limited accessibility to the divan.377 Moreover, Inalcik argues that,
“justice and security were greatest in the regions nearest the capital,”378 seeing as that the
divan was more accessible to those who lived near Istanbul and did not take too long to
reach it. However, it could be concluded here that the divan did indeed address the
subjects’ grievances and aimed at removing injustices or abuses committed against them.
This could to an extent reveal something about the legal system of administration, even if
it at times fell short of justice.
Those developments resulted in the imperial divan becoming more and more of a
bureaucracy and a “decision making entity” that exercised administrative and legal
authority on the sultan’s behalf.379 With the degree of authority and prestige vested in
members of the divan, the sultan’s representatives appropriated political power and
wealth. They answered only to the sultan and he alone could pronounce sentences against
them in matters retaining to the public.380 A case in 1596 calling for the trial of the
defterdar who was accused of accepting bribes was rejected on the premise that “the
chief defterdar acts on the sultan’s authority and is director of the Treasury in the sultan’s
name. To date there has never been an inquiry into this office.”381
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CHAPTER 3: THE JUDICIARY
As previous chapters have shown, there were some significant historical developments
that unfolded after the Ottoman conquests in the 15th and 16th Centuries. Perhaps the most
important of those developments were made in regards to the imperial learned hierarchy,
which saw the rise of a judicial class that was distinctly different from those of other
Muslim state structures. The Ottoman judiciary came to constitute an integral part in the
bureaucratic structure of the state, with the mufti (jurisconsult) and the qadi (judge) as its
centerpieces. The developments of the Ottoman legal system must be in part attributed to
the role the muftis—particularly the seyhulislam—and the qadis played in the
bureaucratization of the state’s administration. In theory, the importance of both those
figures lied in their embodiment of religious practices and traditions.382 As one was
responsible for the interpretation of Islamic law, and the other responsible for the
application of it, the mufti’s and the qadi’s roles were idealized for their sacred
functions.383 However, by the 16th Century their offices grew more politicized and came
to represent some of the innovations of the Ottoman legal practices. It is thus interesting
to see the developments of those offices and how the mufti and qadi served as a crucial
linking point between the state and society and between the “transcendent and
mundane.”384
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I. The Seyhulislam (The Mufti of Istanbul)
This section deals with the role the office of the Mufti of Istanbul played in the evolution
and development of the Ottoman judicial hierarchy. It is primarily concerned with how
the position developed from relative ambiguity to becoming one of the most prestigious
and powerful positions in the Ottoman legal administration by the 16th Century. With the
rise of an imperial learned hierarchy serving as a backdrop to the transformation of the
office of muftiship,385 it is first important to trace back how the institution of muftiship
was viewed with relative independence and how it functioned in the classical legal terms
in the pre-Ottoman period. Furthermore, it is also interesting to see the role the institution
of the seyhulislam realized in widening the Islamic legal discourse and serving to
reconcile the secular elements of the Ottoman legal practice with the shari’a legal theory.
Before pondering on the transformations that the institution of muftiship endured
from pre-Ottoman to post-Ottoman, it is essential to grasp the classical concept of a mufti
and his fatwa (Fetva in Turkish), with issuing fatwas based on the shari’a as his chief
function. With the necessary religious qualifications, a mufti exercised the authority to
issue a fatwa within the scope of the shari’a as an answer to a question presented to
him.386 Serving as the qadi’s counterpart in the Islamic legal system, the capacity that the
mufti held was nonetheless fundamentally different from that of the qadi’s. There are a
number of differences that could be highlighted here. Firstly, although fatwas are
authoritative sources of law, they are however not binding legal statements; unlike a
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qadi’s judgment that is both binding and irrevocable.387 Secondly, a qadi’s ruling is
effective only in a given case, while a mufti’s fatwa becomes an authoritative statement of
law that would still serve as valid for consultation in other cases.388 Thirdly, qadis
primarily tackle disputes either between the subjects or between the subject and the state,
while a mufti deals with a wider range of concerns that vary from obscure matters to
questions regarding religious practices. 389 Fourthly, the qadi’s appointment was a
prerogative of the sultan, whereas the mufti enjoyed a fair degree of independence in
classical legal practice from the state authorities.390 Finally, a mufti, by virtue of his role
in interpreting the Islamic legal doctrine and extending his interpretations to be
administered in new cases, is considered a mujtahid (“a performer of independent legal
discretion”), while a qadi is regarded as a muqallid.391 However, Burak argues that in the
Hanafi legal doctrine, there was also a mufti who was considered a muqallid.392
Highlighting those differences serves in articulating the capacity fulfilled by the
mufti in the judicial system in relation to the qadi. Furthermore, placing the mufti within
the right historical and legal context aids in understanding how he came to constitute part
of the qadi’s court’s legal proceedings. Even though a mufti’s legal opinion is not a
binding statement of law and is thus not enforceable, a qadi may seek legal advice from
him in regards to a specific case to clarify a legal point and base his sentence on his
fatwa.393 Moreover, litigants often consulted the fatwas of muftis and presented them
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before the court to strengthen their position.394 Even though the qadi was not obligated to
administer a fatwa—whereas it was neither required nor rejected by the court—it came to
constitute an integral element in the court proceedings.395 According to Gerber’s study of
thousands of Bursa court records from the 17th Century, all litigants who presented a
fatwas in court won their cases.396 Gerber argues that the reason behind litigants with
fatwas winning their cases is that muftis did not issue their fatwas without spending
sufficient time deliberating a case at hand.397 Furthermore, hundreds of court records
were found to have cited fatwas; however, the eminence of the fatwa in the adjudication
process of the court came later under the Ottomans. Nonetheless, despite being renowned
as an important source for judicial authority, a mufti did not exercise the same power or
stature a qadi did. There was no hierarchy of muftis that existed the same way it had for
the qadis and muftis did not hold any official status.398 They were appealed to for their
religious knowledge and not for being enforcers of the law.399 However, by the 15th
Century, with the emergence of an imperial learned hierarchy came the unprecedented
institutionalization of the muftiship and the rise of the office of seyhulislam. To fully
grasp the extent of this transformation, a brief comparison will be made to the institution
of muftiship during the later period of the Mamluk’s reign.
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Muftiship: From Mamluk to Ottoman and the Evolution of the Seyhulislm
Burak gives an interesting account of the institution of muftiship in the late Mamluk
sultanate and examines the “intense encounter” between the ideals and understandings of
the pre-Ottoman institution and between the new perceptions and the reconstructed form
of this institution under the Ottomans.400 A reading of this transformative juncture serves
as a compelling point of departure for this section wherein it crystalizes the degree of the
accomplishments in the state’s bureaucracy the Ottomans had reached by the 16th
Century. As previously mentioned, qadis were appointed by the sultan whereas muftis
were not; they exercised the issuance of fatwas independently of the state’s authority.
This was true to the reign of the Mamluks.401 How then did muftis gain their credibility of
being commanding sources of judicial authority? It was the prevailing tradition during the
Mamluk period and even earlier for jurists and scholars to travel in the quest for
knowledge to learning centers inside and outside the bounds of the Mamluk sultanate. A
jurist was then often granted a permit by his teacher, which made him a mufti and allowed
him to teach law and issue fatwas.402 Granting a permit became an important element in
the institutionalization of the mufti, which was conferred on the student at some point
during his training career. Gaining the certificate to teach and issue fatwas was necessary
for holding offices, such as becoming a judge or a professor at a madrasa.403 Anyone who
was granted a permit held the prerogative of issuing a fatwa, whether or not they
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occupied a teaching or judicial position. However, only jurists and scholars were entitled
to this permit.404
Muftis did not hold an administrative position during the Mamluks, but qadis did.
However, what is interesting here that becomes later fundamentally different from
Ottoman legal practices is that the differences between a mufti and a judge were not very
clear-cut. A state appointed judge or deputy judge—having been granted a permit—also
exercised the authority of issuing a fatwa. Yet, qadis held official administrative offices
while muftis did not.405 Nonetheless, only the mufti of the Mamluk Dar al’Adl held an
official position; even so, his functions were limited to that of a regular mufti with his
fatwas neither being enforceable nor holding the power to revoke a qadi’s sentence.406
Seeing as that holding a permit supplied any jurist or scholar with the authority of issuing
fatwas, not all of the muftis necessarily held the sufficient or proper knowledge to do so.
In order to curtail some of the fluidity that existed in the institution of muftiship, the
Mamlulk Sultan al-Zahir Barquq by the end of the 14th Century issued an edict restricting
the muftis to abide by their schools of law and declared that it was the duty of the chief
qadis of each school to grant permits to the muftis to issue fatwas in accordance to their
respective schools.407 This depicts that there were some early attempts to standardize the
issuance of fatwas and to a degree limit the number of individuals who could issue them.
It also shows that the “multiplicity” of muftis must have been a predicament to some
extent.408 However, Burak argues that despite the attempts made by the Mamluk sultan,
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the supervision of muftis still fell under the jurisdiction of the jurists and it was not an
administrative matter to deal with.409
Despite not having a hierarchy that paralleled that of the qadis’ there was an
unofficial hierarchy that began to appear, which saw the rise in prominence of certain
muftis over others. Yet, there was still not a coherent institution or a standardized system
that regulated the muftis. This is again shown in the problem the multiplicity of
jurisconsults occasioned in regards to the different opinions that existed amongst muftis
of different schools or within the same school. There were no guiding principles or a
hierarchal authority to turn to in order to settle the “constant dispute and strife” amongst
muftis.410 This lack of homogeneity and uniformity may have served as a prelude to the
“intense encounter” mentioned earlier between the Mamluk model of muftiship and the
Ottoman model. Even though some of the Mamluk jurisconsult practices did indeed
prevail well after the Ottoman conquests of Cairo and Damascus in the 16th Century,
there was a significant change that took place in the provinces. 411 The granting of
permits, despite not being eradicated completely after the conquests, had decreased
dramatically and no longer retained its previous value. Burak affiliates part of this decline
with muftis being granted official appointments in Damascus under the Ottomans.412
By the mid-15th Century, the institution of muftiship began to witness
fundamental changes to its structure under the Ottoman rule. With the rise of the imperial
learned hierarchy and the Ottoman authorities’ regulation of the Hanafi doctrine, as well
as the creation of a specific form of Ottoman “Hanafism,” the office of the seyhulislam
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transpired by the 16th Century to become the head of the entire judicial institution.413 The
emergence of this office prompted a series of significant political and administrative
changes that succeeded in the integration of the religious hierarchy into the bureaucratic
structure of the state.414 Seeing as that the rise of the Ottoman seyhulislam is reckoned to
be one of the most foundational developments and innovations of the 16th Century
Ottoman administration, the focus here will be primarily on examining the nature of the
relationship that developed between the seyhulislam and the state—or the sultan for that
matter—and how the seyhulislam grew more and more politicized. However, before
proceeding with appreciating the dynamic reconfiguration of this office and how it came
to be perceived, it is important to first grasp the shift from the Mamluk model to the
Ottoman model to understand more clearly the changes that were brought about in the
office of muftiship.
The hierarchy of muftis was made up of the seyhulislam—the Mufti of Istanbul—
and below him in rank were the provincial muftis. One of the reasons they were
considered to be lower in rank is that the state-appointed provincial muftis, unlike the
seyhulislam, were obliged to cite the authoritative texts they turned to in their fatwas by
order of the sultan.415 Moreover, one way of introducing change to the institution of
muftiship was appointing official muftis to the provinces. The motivation behind those
appointments was in part to extend the accessibility to subjects of muftis with
authoritative opinions.416 Prior to the designation of provincial muftis, the subjects had to
413
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either send their inquiries to the mufti in Istanbul or to travel to the capital themselves.417
Furthermore, one of the chief functions of appointing muftis to the provinces was to
oversee the activities of officials and judges and to ensure that there was no oppression
taking place as well as that they were abiding by the shari’a regulations.418 In regards to
the appointment deed itself, the state authorities appointed muftis “from among the
professors or from among the pious who were capable of issuing legal opinions.”419
There was an association between the rise of the imperial madrasa system and the
appointment of provincial muftis. It was often the case that teachers in important
madrasas established by the sultans were appointed as provincial muftis. There was also a
correlation between appointing muftis from the more important madrasas to holding the
office in major cities. According to Burak, “the attachment of the office of the mufti to a
prominent provincial madrasa characterizes mostly large urban centers.”420 That created a
form of hierarchy that existed amongst muftis in the provinces; their salaries were one
indication of the emergence of this hierarchy where salaries ranged from 40 akçes to 100
akçes a day.421 Another aspect of this correlation was the fact that this could have been
one attempt to “Ottomanize” the institution of the muftiship through reinforcing the
position of the Hanafi mufti seeing as that, “the joint post [of mufti and teacher] passed at
least temporarily from the hands of local scholars into those of Ottoman scholars.”422
Even though the position of muftis constituted an official post in the Ottoman
administration, their hierarchy and career and training tracks were not fully developed
417
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like that of the qadis’ or muderris’,423 the appointments by the central government of
provincial muftis created a distinction and a division of functions between judges and
muftis, which also curtailed the “fluididity” that existed in the pre-ottoman institution of
muftiship where almost anyone with a permit could issue fatwas. Moreover, perhaps this
was one of creating a standardized judicial authority that limited who the subjects could
turn to for legal opinions and also the “form” of rulings dispensed, as well as tying the
provincial subjects more and more to the capital in a more cohesive manner.
Despite the emphasis Repp places on what he calls “the second class of mufti,”—
which follows the class of seyhulislam—there is a much richer literature that exists on the
office of seyhulislam in contrast to that of the provinces.424 The emergence of the office
of seyhulislam in the mid-15th Century did not see the instant crystallization of the office
as it had in the 16th Century. One motive for the early appointment of seyhulislam lied in
the growing need to create an image of religiosity of the state and to establish it within
the “Islamic realm.” Another was, according to Michael M. Pixley, to subvert the power
of the sultan’s opponents. 425 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the office of
seyhulislam was one way to counter the government’s secular character by placing a
symbolic religious figure. It is argued that the seyhulislam retained the same “symbolic”
image as that of the Abbasid Caliphs in Mamluk Cairo. However, the capacity that the
seyhulislam grew to fulfill shows that the office was fundamentally different from that of
the Caliph’s. He represented an institution that later became highly involved in state
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affairs.426 Moreover, according to the kanunname of Mehmed II which marked a major
development in the office of seyhulislam, the functions of the office were described along
with the status that the seyhulislam was to retain—which placed the position of the
seyhulislam on the same grade as that of the grand vezir’s and entailed that the office was
to hold even more respect. 427
Seeing as that the seyhulislam was meant to employ a religious status in the
Ottoman government away from “worldly” things, he in theory was not meant to receive
a salary.428 However, the first seyhulislam was said to have received a salary of 30 akce
per day while the kadi-‘asker received 500 akce daily. This, Pixley argues, “underscores
the low profile of the seyhulislam” in the early 15th Century.429 However, the nature of
the office of seyhulislam drastically changed from the 15th to the 16th Century in terms of
perceptions: how they and other viewed them. Repp puts forward an interesting theory in
this regard. He contends that in the 15th Century, when the office was still not fully
developed, a scholar was more concerned with attaining “excellence in ‘ilm,” whereas by
the 17th Century, a scholar’s success was linked to the status of his rank and salary.430 To
what extent this was true could be contested; however, it is safe to say that by the 16th
Century the office of the seyhulislam shifted towards a more “politicized nature” and held
more prerogatives that entitled them to more authority.
Some of the functions that became attached to the office by the 16th Century
involved tending to the state’s administrative needs. The seyhulislam was incorporated in
426
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the decisions made in regards to the conduct of government and public policy.431 This
was born out of the relationship that flourished between the seyhulislam and the sultan.
Before making important decisions, the sultan often consulted the seyhulislam and the
grand vezir—heads of the religious and administrative authorities.432 The sultan also
frequently turned to the seyhulislam if he wished to alter something in legal policy.433 By
the 16th Century, the fatwa of the chief mufti was one aspect of this relationship. Pixley
distinguishes between two types of fatwas: those involved in administrative affairs and
those that are concerned with the public.434 The strength of the seyhulislam’s fatwa
played an important role in undermining the authority of the qadi. When it came to the
issue of differences of opinions amongst jurists, Ebu’s-su’ud’s suggestion to the sultan
was, “to ensure that the individual [qadi] is…not permitted freely to choose whose
opinion he will follow, but obliges to adjudicate in accordance with the sultan’s
directives.”435 Those sultanic decrees were often promulgated on the initiative of the
seyhulislam. If he wished to alter a point of law, the seyhulislam petitioned the sultan to
issue a decree that would be binding on the qadis to enforce in their courts.436 This shows
to what extent the seyhulislam’s office grew more attached to the sultan and, despite not
being enforcers of the law, could affect what and how Islamic law was applied in the
qadi’s court.
The nature of this relationship developed by the early 16th Century when Ali
Cemali was seyhulislam. His period in office witnessed the three reigns of Bayzeid II,
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Selim I, and Suleyman I.437 It was his encounters with Selim I that are worth noting here.
When Ali Cemali heard that Selim I had ordered the execution of 150 treasury officials
without clear evidence that establishes their offence, he went uninvited to the council to
meet the sultan and told him that, “The duty of the [seyhulislam] is to watch over the
after-life of the sultan. I have heard that you have ordered the executing of 150 men, the
execution of whom is not lawful under the shari’a. You must pardon them.”438 Enraged,
the sultan answered that it was not Ali Cemali’s position to interfere with the state affairs.
However persistent, Ali Cemali insisted that he was interfering with the after-life of the
sultan who will suffer greatly if he does not pardon them. Eventually, the sultan agreed to
pardon them.439 In another case, Ali Cemali saved again another 400 silk merchants from
execution by order of Selim I, once again under the rationalization of saving the sultan
from the punishment of the after-life. When he calmed down, Selim I ordered the
appointment of the two posts of the kadi-‘askers; however, Ali Cemali refused on the
basis that, “he had sworn an oath to God never to let the word hakamtu pass his lips.”440
Those two stories showcase the seyhulislam’s growing influence over the sultan. Even
though the early 16th Century the institution of the seyhulislam had not yet witnessed its
peak of development, there were more responsibilities being attached to it.
As mentioned earlier, with the seyhulsilam being more involved with the sultan,
the latter began to incorporate the former in matters of public policy. The seyhulislam
was used as a tool to legalize certain actions by the state affecting its internal and external
affairs. For instance, before launching the military campaigns against the Mamluks,
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Selim I “put three questions to Ali Cemali who, in his answers to them, gave a legal basis
for the projected campaign;” 441 thus, providing the sultan with sufficient religious
grounds to proceed with the conquests. This was not the only case where certain
administrative actions were based on the opinions of the religious scholars or the
seyhulislam in particular for justifications. Suleyman I’s campaign against the safavids
was said to have been advocated by Kemalpaşazade 442 —one of the renowned 16th
Century seyhulislams. Another example that serves this point is when the fatwa of Ebu’ssu’ud was sought out by the sultan to justify breaking the treaty with Venice in which the
Ottomans seized Cyprus, despite the lack of consent amongst most vezirs.443
The office of seyhulislam reached its height with Ebu’s-su’ud (1543-1574)444—
the most celebrated and distinguished seyhulislam in Ottoman history. A fitting
description that serves as the prologue of Ebu’s-su’ud’s time as seyhulislam is cited in
Imber: “the office of Mufti was troubled and passing from hand to hand. The roof of its
house was unsupported, until its destiny was delivered to [Ebu’s-su’ud] and its keys
handed over [to him].”445 There was a total of seven seyhulislams in the 16th Century
starting with Ali Cemali and up to Ebu’s-su’ud.446 After the death of Kemalpaşazade who
held office for 11 years, there were four other chief muftis before Ebu’s-su’ud. The four
of them held office for a short period (the first held it for 5 years, the second held it for 4
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years until his dismissal, the third for 1 year, and the fourth for 2 years).447 This was an
indication that the office before Ebu’s-su’ud underwent a troubled phase and was to a
degree weakened by the turnover. One aspect of this was that in theory, the chief muftis
held tenure and were not prone to dismissals. However, the 16th Century witnessed the
first dismissal of the seyhulislam—some were even executed later in the 17th Century.448
With the emergence of Ebu’s-su’ud as seyhulislam, the office gained a lot of
prerogatives, power, and prestige. There are a number of main developments in the office
that are associated with Ebu’s-su’ud that elucidate to what extent it had changed and are
of relevance here. The most nominal of which are his many attempts to reconcile the
shari’a with the kanun and his involvement in policy making (this is further discussed in
the next subsection). When it comes to decision-making, Ebu’s-su’ud grew more drawn
to the political realm of the state more than the religious. He is most known for his efforts
in extending the doctrine of the shari’a to fit the innovations introduced by the Ottoman
authorities in several aspects of the state’s administration.449 The famous Maruzat of
Ebu’s-su’ud—the ‘Matters’ submitted by him to Suleyman I—offer an important link
between the seyhulislam and the sultan. It showcases the extent of Ebu’s-su’ud’s
intervention in administrative matters of the state wherein he would issue a fatwa
regarding a legal problem and petitions the sultan to endorse it, who in turn does so and
decrees a firman that is thus sent out to qadis and governors to enforce it.450 Furthermore,
what is noteworthy about the Maruzat fatwa collections is that it cites a lot of the kanun
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decrees of Suleyman I,451 which shows to the willingness of the seyhulislam to issue
opinions outside of the scope of the shari’a. He was no longer confined by the bounds of
the shari’a doctrine, but became highly involved in the kanun as well. Some of the
chapters in fatwa collections cover issues such as land or criminal laws that are not dealt
with in the shari’a.452 Seeing as that the mufti was regarded as a mujtahid, Ebu’s-su’ud
utilized “legal fictions” to find grounds in the shari’a for kanun innovations. 453
According to Heyd, the seyhulislam and other muftis became more “authorized” and
inclined to issue fatwas in accordance to both the shari’a and kanun.454 If the seyhulislam
is asked a question in regards to an issue not dealt with in the shari’a, he issued a fatwa
based on kanun.455 One reason for this degree of acceptance of Ebu’s-su’ud towards the
kanun regulations is that prior to being seyhulislam he had served as qadi and kadi-‘asker
of Rumelia where he “followed” the kanun for a lengthy period of time so it was not
apprehensible for him to deem kanun as illegal now that he became seyhulislam.456
Another possible reason that Ebu’s-su’ud had established in one of his rulings is that,
“there can no decree of the Sultan ordering something that is illegal according to the
shari’a.”457 Thus, the kanun could not have simply contradicted the shari’a. To what
extent or it did not is the centerpoint of a lot of debate.
However, regardless here of the debate, Ebu’s-su’ud must be credited for his
efforts to systematize the law. There are a number of innovations that were introduced
and legalized by Ebu’s-su’ud that could be briefly mentioned here other than the ones
451
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that will be expanded on below: legalization of fines, the statute of limitations, and the
liability of blood-money. As previously mentioned in the chapter on Ottoman lawmaking, the kanun prescribed fines to a number of offences, which was a penalty that is
outside of the scope of the shari’a. This dates back to the kanunname of Mehmed II;
however, it is of importance here that Ebu’s-su’ud legitimized the “fiscal” character of
this penalty and even prescribed it in some of his fatwas. When asked if it was authorized
for a judge or governor to impose a monetary fine, Ebu’s-su’ud’s response was: “I have
heard from a reliable person that a money fine is permissible if the judge or governor sees
fit. A case in point is when a man does not attend Friday prayer. It is permissible to
punish him with a fine.”458 Moreover, the statute of limitation serves as another case
wherein the sultan issued a decree on the initiative of a fatwa of Ebu’s-su’ud. The
sultanic decree enacted in 1550, fixed “an obligatory statute of limitation of ten years in
all matters other than those pertaining to sown lands, in which the limit for filing suits
was set at fifteen years.”459 This was, once again a change introduced on the basis of
Ebu’s-su’ud’s ijtiahd wherein jurists before him have pondered over the matter for years
and it had remained unresolved. In regards to the liability of blood-money, which was
briefly discussed in the chapter on Ottoman law-making, the decree issued holding the
occupant of a residence where a murder took place liable for blood-money was also based
on the initiative of Ebu’s-su’ud. Here, the seyhulislam requested that the sultan should
adopt the opinion of Abu Yusuf over that of Abu Hanifa’s who was of the opinion that
the owner and not the occupant should be held liable.460 Those cases serve to demonstrate
the nature of the relationship between the seyhulislam and the sultan and to what extent
458
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the workings of both the former and the latter led to legitimized efforts to expand the
legal doctrine to encompass Ottoman innovations.
Other forms of developments that were witnessed in the institutionalization of the
office of seyhulislam during Ebu’s-su’ud were the growth in his salary, the authority he
gained in making judicial appointments, 461 and lastly, his contributions to the
bureaucratization of the institution of fatwa.462 As once stated, as a religious rather than a
secular image, the seyhulislam was in theory not meant to receive a salary; however, Ali
Cemali did receive a daily wage of 30 akçes, which was markedly less than that of the
wage the kadi-‘asker had received then. However, when Ebu’s-su’ud assumed office, his
daily wage rose to 600 akçes after the additions Suleyman I made to his salary.463
Furthermore, besides the rise in his salary, Ebu’s-su’ud also gained the authority of
becoming involved in the appointments of the imperial learned hierarchy.464 This was
previously a prerogative of the kadi-‘askers with the grand vezir or the sultan either
confirming or rejecting them. 465 Pixley offers two explanations for this shift in the
authority of judicial nominations; the first being that the grand vezir became preoccupied
with more pressing matters than to go over the nominations, while the second is that this
was an attempt to curb the power of the kadi-‘askers.466 Either way, those developments
led to the seyhulislam assuming more power and prestige.
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The last development deserves some attention here.467 The degree of evolution
that the office of seyhulislam witnessed during Ebu’s-su’ud is again discerned in the
contributions that he made to the institution of the fatwa. According to Pierce, “the
influence of his position was reflected in the exponential increase in the number of fatwas
he issued and in the parallel elaboration of a fatwa office.”468 His predecessor, Ali
Cemali, also known as “the basket man,” used to have a small basket that he hung from
his window where people used to put their questions on a piece of paper. He would then
pull it back up when a petitioner pulled at the string, wrote down the answer on the same
piece of paper and sent the basket back down.469 Earlier in the 16th Century, the fatwas
were issued and delivered personally by the seyhulislam. Nonetheless, when Ebu’s-su’ud
assumed office under the reign of Suleyman, the seyhulislam’s role grew to encompass
more tasks and could no longer adequately meet the requirements of the increasing
number of fatwas.
The average number of fatwas issued twice a week ranged from 300 to 400
fatwas. However, Ebu’s-su’ud is known to have issued 1412 fatwas in one day and on
another he had issued 1413 fatwas. This is not to be merely attributed to the seyhulislam’s
degree of efficacy but rather to the growing bureaucratized nature of his office by mid16th Century. The previous informal system of the issuance of fatwas that had existed
before Ebu’s-su’ud limited the number of fatwas that could be issued per day. However,
the new setup of a department dealing specifically with the issuance of fatwa introduced
by Ebu’s-su’ud greatly bureaucratized the procedure in which fatwas were dispensed.
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The institution began to heavily depend on highly trained clerks who would write a
petitioner’s question in the right format, which was again reexamined before being
submitted to the seyhulislam. He would then write and sign his response and hand it to
another clerk who would it pass it on to the questioner. The system involved even more
clerks in the entire process from the question being first submitted to the response being
handed out. This creation of the division of labor made for a highly efficient system of
issuing fatwas that could meet the demands of the increasing numbers of questions
coming in to the office of seyhulislam. Most times, the question was formulated in such a
way that made the answer very clear wherein the seyhulislam answered simply with a yes
or no.470 However, the only times where the seyhulislam wrote the question and answer
himself when it was in response to a question posed by either the sultan or a high
government officials, 471 or when there was too much pressure of work. 472 The
developments and innovations introduced to the fatwa institution are one aspect that
showcase to what extent the office of seyhulislam had become highly bureaucratized and
involved in the state structure.473 It also depicts the emphasis placed on the fatwa and the
strength that was attributed to it by the 16th Century. The fall of some sultans and grand
vezirs came about on the basis of a fatwa. Sultan Ibrahim (1640-48) was deposed and
executed on the strength of a fatwa.474 The fatwa came to resemble a legal power that
justified actions that were controversial in nature.
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Ebu’s-su’ud’s Attempts to Reconcile the Kanun with the Shari’a: The Cash Waqf
Controversy and the Mu’amalat
Kemalpaşazade and Ebu’s-su’ud were known for their efforts to reconcile the kanun with
the shari’a. However, Ebu’s-su’ud attempts at reconciliation were unparalleled. He is
known for his many endeavors to bring Ottoman legal innovations into the workings of
the shari’a. Jurists were often confronted with certain traditional practices that violated
the Islamic doctrine. The response was to develop methodical opinions to create more
coherent justifications for the unlawful practices.475 This is exactly what Ebu’s-su’ud did
in regards to the issue of cash waqf to rest the controversy that stemmed from it.
Jon E. Mandaville put forward an interesting study that details the dynamics of
the cash waqf controversy that unfolded in the 16th Century. The practice of cash waqf
(waqf al-nuqud) meant, as Mandaville puts it, “The establishment of a trust with money
the interest from which might pay the salary of a teacher, or a preacher, or even
unashamedly pass into the pocket of the founder of the trust.”476 By the 15th Century, the
practice of cash endowments was authorized in Ottoman courts despite jurists having
condemned such practices that were unprecedented in the Islamic world.477 The rationale
that served to legalize the institution of cash waqf followed that it was the common
practice in most of Anatolia and Rumeli. The earliest example saw the charging of a 10%
annual interest from the lent cash in 1423. The number of cash awqaf in relation to land
awqaf between the reign of Mehmed II and Murad II was relatively low. The argument
was that so long as cash waqf took up a small percentage of the awqaf as a whole, there
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was no real problem. However, cash waqf became the prevailing form of endowment by
the 16th Century and the debate ensued among the jurists “long after there was any chance
for a reversal of the practice.”478
The whole debate was centered around the fact that waqf was meant to be a
permanent form of endowment that did not diminish and had a perpetual character.
However, Abu Yusuf and Muhammad al-Shaybani accepted the endowment of certain
moveables but not cash.479 Their permissibility was again established on the basis that
this was the accepted practice (ta’amul) of the time. This concept of ta’amul was to be
utilized and extended by the Ottomans in their reinforcement of the legal practice of cash
waqf. The works of Ottoman scholars in support of the cash endowments in 15th Century
cite the opinions of Abu Yusuf and al-Shaybani in regards to the legality of moveables.
However, they explicitly kept out the fact that they did not approve of cash awqaf. This
was a practice that had become embedded in the Ottoman legal procedures and was
signed and accepted by the seyhulislams and kadi-‘askers. It was unquestioned until in
the 1540s the kadi-‘asker of Rumeli, Çivizade,480 ruled that he disagreed with the cash
waqf practice. The debate erupted between the Islamic legal theory and the Ottoman legal
practice and was to continue on to the next century. This is when the efforts of Ebu’ssu’ud at reconciliation were most notable. He responded to the opinion issued by
Çivizade with a fatwa legalizing the practice of cash waqf on the basis that it is “popular
and generally practice,” and that judges and governors have for long validated it. Thus,
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“the practice was perfectly sound and irrevocable.”481 In one of his fatwas found in his
Maruzat, Ebu’s-su’ud’s ruling is seen as follows:482
Q: Explain according to what mezheb is the cash waqf judged to be legal
and irrevocable. Must the judgment be, first, that it is valid (sihhatina) and
second, that it is irrevocable (lazim)?
A: Judges are now authorized to rule thus.

Seeing as that Ebu’s-su’ud’s fatwa, despite being an authoritative source of law, is nonbinding, it had to be supported by the strength of a sultanic decree. Thus, to end ikhtilaf
al-fuqaha’ over the controversy of cash waqf—and once again based on the initiative of
the seyhulislam—Suleyman I issued a sultanic decree in 1548 formally legalizing the
practice.483 Additionally, Ebu’s-su’ud wrote a 28-page essay serving as legal grounds for
cash waqf.484 It is important to note here that this was the common practice in the central
provinces of the empire and was not practiced in the Arab provinces.485
Interest on loans—which was also connected to the practice of cash
waqf486—was another problematic issue that became rather prevalent by the 16th Century.
It served as yet another bone of contention between the shari’a legal doctrine and the
Ottoman legal practice of kanun. In the Ottoman Criminal Code of Suleyman I, Article
number 103 states that, “persons who make [loan] transactions in accordance with the
shari’a shall not be allowed [to take] more than eleven for [every] ten [pieces of money
lent].” 487 Accordingly, any rate that would exceed the 10% interest—which was
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supposedly meant to be in compliance with the shari’a—would be considered illegal.488
Even though this was another sultanic decree based on the initiative of Ebu’s-su’ud, the
interest rates on loans during his term fluctuated between 5%-30%.489 In the shari’a
courts of Anatolia in the 17th Century, interests at 20% were the common accepted
practice that was approved by both the judiciary and the sultan.490 However, attempts
were made to introduce the concept of riba in a more subtle expression so as to not be in
clear violation with the shari’a. Euphemisms such as ribh and mu’amala were often used
instead.491
Ebu’s-su’ud issued fatwas legalizing kanun provisions on interest on loans. The
problem that Ebu’s-su’ud faced was that this was, just with the case of cash waqf, never
authorized in Hanafi law. He resorted to hiyal as a tool to circumvent the Islamic legal
doctrine that forbids the usage of riba. He placed emphasis on the concept of mu’amala
shari’ya instead.492 Even though there was a fluctuation in the rate of interests on loan, in
1565, the rate was set at 15%.493 He issued a fatwa in response to a question asking what
would happen to a person who carries out a transaction at a 20% interest rate, stating that,
“a severe chastisement and a long imprisonment are necessary. He should be released
when his reform becomes apparent.”494 Even though mu’amala shari’ya was legalized,
there were still efforts to impose limitations and control the money market. Imber
contends that, “Ebu’s-su’ud in fact had a more urgent and…more practical concern than
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concealing interest, and this was to prevent extortion by controlling the percentage at
which it was payable.”495

II. The Qadi
When discussing what has been since the Umayyad period the essence of the judicial
establishment, it is difficult to place the qadiship within the framework of change and
development the same way one could when examining the evolutions in the institution of
muftiship. Seeing as that the institution of the seyhulislam was chiefly an Ottoman
innovation, it was less challenging to offer a clear-cut outline of the pre and post Ottoman
bureaucratization and institutionalization of the office. However, the same does not
readily apply to the office of qadi given that its foundation could be traced back to the
Umayyad period. This section will nevertheless attempt to pinpoint the main junctures of
developments of the qadiship during the Ottoman period and the important place it
fulfilled in the legal system of administration.
Upon examining the evolution of the office of qadi over the centuries and up to
the Ottoman period, one often comes across the Max Weber theory of kadijustiz (qadi
justice).496 It serves to point out here briefly the workings of this Weberian system. He
believed that the development and evolution of law was dependent on rationality and
predictability, which hence set forth the 16th Century rise of capitalism in the West.497 On
the other hand, he held the conviction that Islamic law was not based on the same merits.
The notion of kadijustiz prescribed that, as quoted by Elyse Semerdjian, “judges [in
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Islamic society] never refer to a settled group of norms or rules but are simply licensed to
decide each case according to what they see as its individual merits.”498 This dictated a
system where the qadi was not actively engaged in a guided and canonized system of
rules; that his judgments were based on arbitrariness and his authority unbounded.499 He
acted on his own instincts where his swift and uncalculated judgments were final and
could not be appealed.

500

Thus, “Islamic law was judicially primitive and

undeveloped.”501 However, many contemporary scholars have risen against the Weberian
kadijustiz with intricate studies on the adequacy of Islamic law as a positivist law.502
Nonetheless, the purpose here is not to delve into the refutations and the sociological
arguments that developed against the viability of the Weberian notion of kadijustiz, but
rather to give a brief idea when moving forward with examining the evolution in the
office of the qadi that the Ottoman judiciary was not a stagnant form of legal body but
was one that was adaptable and capable of change and development. It was not one that
was generally based on arbitrariness or the whimsical character of the qadi. On the
contrary, as Pierce argues, the personality and integrity of the qadi played an important
aspect in legal practice and the quality of the administration of justice.503 Thus, there was
emphasis that was placed in Islam on the etiquette that a qadi should retain as well as
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certain qualities—seven in number according to Al Mawardi504—that would make him
eligible to becoming a qadi.
The qadi serves as one of the most important elements in understanding the
dynamic relations between the Ottoman state and its subjects seeing as that he was
stationed at the center of the government, society, and law. The office of the qadi and the
prominent place it came to retain by the Ottoman period is closely interconnected with
the state’s many attempts to standardize the law of procedure and to integrate people
within the state structure by placing a court and a qadi in every province. As the enforcer
of the law, the qadi was considered as an integral component in the establishment and
centralization of the Ottoman administration.505 However, in order to work out the degree
of developments undertaken by this office by the 16th Century as well as the innovations
introduced to it, it is interesting to trace back the developments it sustained in the preOttoman period.
The classical tradition of appointing the qadi has been long before the Ottomans a
prerogative of the ruling authorities.506 Under the Umayyad rule (661-750), the qadi
exercised an important role in the formulation of Islamic law. He relied on his
independent reasoning based on a combination of ethical traditions derived from the
Qur’an and traditional practices extracted from other legal systems.507 Nonetheless, with
the materialization of more coherent doctrines of the four Sunni schools of law and the
articulation of a hierarchy of authorities regarding the interpretation of the law, the qadi
gradually lost his capacity as a mujtahid. This prerogative went to the muftis whereas the
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qadi became the enforcer of the law and not the interpreter of it.508 Those judicial
transformations took place shortly after the mihna (failure of inquisition) in 849 under the
Abbasids.509 Before moving further, it is important to note here other developments that
unfolded at the onset of the reign of the Abbasids (750-1258) and before the changes in
the judiciary of 849.
Under the Abbasids, the judiciary was organized and put in order for the first
time. Earlier during the Umayyad period, the qadi acted as the legal advisor of the
governors.510 However, the qadi ceased exercising this function and by the Abbasid
period, his functions became more closely tied to the shari’a where he was to adjudicate
only in accordance to the sacred doctrine from the moment he assumed qadiship until he
was released from his duties.511 Even though the qadi employed a degree of independence
wherein the authorities could not interfere in his affairs, his jurisdiction was limited when
it came to matters of criminal procedures. Seeing as that the administration of justice in
criminal affairs did not directly fall within the bounds of the shari’a—and the qadi’s
judgments were confined by the shari’a—the qadi came to rely on other official
authorities and the caliph for the enforcement of his sentences in regards to criminal
matters. This opted for the increased intervention of official authorities in the office of the
qadi wherein the qadi became easily subject to dismissals.512 This form of administration
of justice executed by the caliph and his state officials came to be known as siyasa—
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“state policy…and…the right of the ruler and his agents to impose discretionary
punishment.”513
Nevertheless, the Abbasids moved towards the creation of a centralized institution of
qadiship. This is seen in the establishment of the office of the chief qadi (qadi al-qudat)
who served as the Caliph’s subordinate in regards to appointments and dismissals of
qadis as well as other judicial officials, which became one of his chief tasks.514 He also
acted as the Caliph’s counselor in all matters regarding justice. 515 In spite of the
institutionalization of the office of the qadi, there were other developments undertaken
during the Abbasids that coincided with its centralization. The creation of the mazalim
tribunals (courts of appeal) is one important aspect of those developments that will be
mentioned here. The mazalim courts functioned separately from the qadi’s tribunals. The
sultan himself presided over the mazalim courts or delegated his officials to hear
subjects’ complaints against the injustices or wrongful sentences passed by qadis or
executive officials. The creation of such a tribunal to a degree hindered the authority the
qadi exercised wherein certain cases regarding’s property for instance were meant to fall
under the jurisdiction of the qadi court but were nevertheless dealt with in the mazalim
courts. Moreover, seeing as that the qadi courts (or shari’a courts) operated within the
scope of the shari’a, there were matters that could not be brought before the qadi. Thus,
the mazalim courts functioned as a supplementary organ dealing with lawsuits that the
qadi courts fell short of.
513
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This dichotomy of the administration of justice was to continue on under the Mamluk
Sultanate.516 However, the mazalim courts were abolished under the Ottomans in the
reformulation and development of the Ottoman judicial system, which put an end to the
separation of tribunals. The Ottomans gave the shari’a courts of the qadis superiority by
creating one court that dealt with both the secular and shari’a matters and abolishing the
mazalim tribunals.517 This could be reflected in one of the main objectives of the Ottoman
restructuring of the judiciary, which was to standardize and systematize the legal system
of administration.518 The pre-Ottoman period suffered from a plurality in the number of
those who administered justice. Thus, the emphasis that was placed on the role the qadi
exercised aimed at creating a more consistent and coherent system of judicial
procedures.519 The practice of placing the qadi’s office at the heartland of the state’s
administration was one way of permanently integrating it into the apparatus of the state in
the refining period of the Ottoman Empire. Gerber adds that one reason for the elevation
of the office of the qadi was to counterbalance the degree of authority the religious
bureaucracy exercised.520
A clearer understanding of the nature of the office of the qadi and its functions under the
Ottomans is of importance here. Seeing as that the Ottomans opted for the amalgamation
of the functions of the mazalim and shari’a courts into one court under the qadi’s
jurisdiction, the qadi’s role was broadened to include that of a “civil administrator”
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besides his role as an enforcer of the religious law.521 His most crucial function was the
operation of the court, which was also extended to deal with criminal and secular matters
that were not necessarily bound by the shari’a laws.522 Other than overseeing the affairs
of the court and adjudicating lawsuits, the qadi performed other legal formalities that
involved registering marriage contracts, the selling and buying of property, as well as
registering loans.523 He also played a role in the distribution of inheritance, administering
waqfs, and the regulation of taxation levels.524 Furthermore, the qadi served as the legal
guardian for orphans, brides, and those who had no guardians.525 He was assigned to
carry out inspections and submit a report (However, this was particularly a function of the
provincial qadi).526 Additionally, the qadi acted as a mediator between disputing parties
before taking the case to court.527 The broadening of the functions and role of the qadi
situated him and his court at the locus of the judicial system, which was an Ottoman
innovation that was unprecedented in Islam. 528 Taking on responsibilities that went
beyond the enforcement of the shari’a depicts the increased secular role the qadi came to
fulfill as a civil administrator. However, it is important to note here that despite the
amplification of his office and the upsurge in the multitude of tasks he came to hold, the
qadi remained first and foremost a subordinate of the sultan. He was his representative,
521
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empowered to execute and enforce the sultanic decrees.529 The qadi obtained his orders
and authority directly from the sultan and could personally petition him without a
mediator in between them.530
In their efforts to standardize and centralize the law of procedure throughout the
empire, the Ottomans sent a copy of the kanunname to every qadi’s court.531 The kanun
specifically pinpoints the functions and role of the qadi in enforcing the law. Gerber
contends that “[this indicates] that the Ottomans certainly intended the kadi, and as a rule
no other authority, to apply the kanun.”532 However, the sultan ordered the Viziers too to
administer justice according to both the shari’a and the kanun;533 but the innovation here
is in the development discerned in the broadening of the authority of the qadi by
instructing him to enforce his judgments according to both laws. This is reiterated in a
number of kanuns, where the qadi is enjoined to carry out his investigations “according to
the shari’a and the kanun,” or “according to the noble shari’a and the kanunname
deposited in the law-courts” as stated in the text of the law code.534 The preface of the
Ottoman Criminal Code complied by one of the clerks in a shari’a court in the 17th
Century states that:
The judges of the sacred law are not restricted to hearing shari’a cases
only but are appointed and ordered to decide disputes and terminate
litigation in regard to both shari’a and ‘urf matters. Therefore, just as on
shari’a questions fikh works are studied, so it is considered [their] duty in
regard to ‘urf matters to study the registers of the Sultan’s kanuns.535
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This delineates the power and jurisdiction bestowed on the qadi in overseeing the
execution of the shari’a laws as well as the sultanic decrees. In certain cases, the qadis
responded and adjudicated on lawsuits that were governed only by the kanun.536 When
there was no sufficient evidence for the qadi to pronounce a shari’a judgment, he did so
in accordance to the kanun.537 When the matter was not evidently clear in the kanun
provisions, he sent to the capital for a judgment and executed the sentence that he
consequently received.538 Having the kanun at their disposal, the qadis exercised a broad
discretionary form of authority that was different from earlier periods in Islam.
Furthermore, in endowing the qadi with such powers under the Ottoman law, it is
interesting to see the nature of the relationship between the qadis and the executive
officials that throve from such regulations. Both qadis and the executive officials
exercised the authority of administering justice on the sultan’s behalf. The different
functions between the two are highlighted in the kanunname of the 17th Century wherein
the qadis “are to carry out the laws of the shari’a…but are ordered to refer matters
relating to public order, the protection and defence of the subjects, and the capital or
corporal punishment (siyaset) [of criminals] to the [local] representatives of the sultan,
who are the governors in charge of military and serious penal affairs.” By order of the
sultan, those were the two authorities to administer justice in the provinces. The executive
official (governors, Viziers, and other high-ranking officials)539 represented the sultan’s
executive authority, whereas the qadi represented his legal authority. 540 Despite
exercising the sultan’s executive authority, the sultan’s officials’ powers were to a degree
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limited by the new kanun provisions. The governors were the qadis’ real contenders.
They seized some of the functions and authorities that the qadis employed.541 Thus, one
of the main goals of Suleyman I’s series of reforms in the 16th Century was to curtail the
power of the executive officials. This was done through giving the qadis the capacity to
oversee the legality of the executive officials’ actions. One of the means in which the
kanun kept the latter’s authority in check was by entrusting the qadi with a number of
prerogatives that the executive officials first had to go through before taking certain
measures. The qadis were thus placed in charge of overseeing the actions of the executive
officials who had to take permission from the qadi before imprisoning or torturing
suspects for confessions.542 Nevertheless, not all executive officials were pleased with
such judicial dominance and power being usurped from them. Some even went as far as
petitioning the sultan against being put through the innovation of being judged by a
qadi,543 which in all probability they deemed to be inferior to them.
However, the executive officials still retained some power over the qadi.
According to the kanun criminal code, in the case where the qadi examined the evidence
of the case and reached the conclusion that the evidence were not sufficient enough for
him to carry out a shari’a punishment, he would then write a certificate (huccet) detailing
the statements of the case without suggesting a suitable sentence, and would in turn hand
the case over to the executive officials who would then administer a siyasa
punishment. 544 The final sentence, however, was the qadi’s and not the executive
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official’s.545 Moreover, the qadi possessed the capacity of supervising financial affairs546
and he was the one responsible for collecting local tax revenues and handed them over to
the governor to hand over to the military.547 It had to first go through the qadi who would
directly report any illegal actions committed by the executive officials.548 It is important
to note further the kind of functions the executive official administered in order to
delineate the differences between him and the qadi. According to Jennings, he cites that,
“The principal duties of the sancak begi (the governor of a sancak) did not go beyond,
from the military point of view, going on campaign at the head of the timar-holding
spahis; from the administrative point of view, putting into force the police matters of
cities in the sancak; and protecting the tranquility of the timar lands providing soldiers
(more correctly, of the revenues which do not have the right of independence). All
matters outside of these two duties lay within the authority of the kadi of every judicial
district.”549 Thus, this division of tasks was an essential aspect of aiming to develop a just
administrative system, by keeping the authority of both functionaries constantly in check.
Another significant innovation that was introduced by the Ottoman authorities
concerning the office of the qadi was the introduction of courthouses for the first time.
This was true in regards to the Arab provinces. There already existed judicial districts
headed each by a qadi in Anatolia. 550 However, the case was different under the
Mamluks. The Mamluk four qadi al-qudat usually had designated buildings used as
courthouses. As for the other qadis, seeing as that they were not compelled to convene in
545

Jennings, Ronald C. “Kadi, Court, and Legal Procedure in 17th C. Ottoman Kayseri: The Kadi and the
Legal System.” Studia Islamica, No. 48 (1978): 159.
546
Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, p. 118.
547
Jennings, “Kadi, Court, and Legal Procedure,” p. 158.
548
Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, p. 118.
549
Jennings, “Kadi, Court, and Legal Procedure,” p. 159.
550
Hanna, “The Administration of Courts in Ottoman Cairo,” p. 48.

114

a specific place, they held sessions in their places of residence or in mosques. With the
Ottoman conquests of 1516 and 1517, courthouses were introduced in different districts
of the provinces.551 This was one way of encouraging the public to take their disputes to
the court before the qadi. 552 It also emphasized the qadi’s image as a “public
prosecutor” 553 and his importance in dispute resolutions. Furthermore, as previously
mentioned in Chapter 1, the Ottomans abolished the plural legal system of having four
qadi al-qudat represent each Sunni school of law and appointed one chief Hanafi qadi to
represent the Ottoman official school. The sultan-appointed chief qadi usually served a
term of one year and was normally a Turk.554 Being of non-Arab origins did not give
much room for him to get accustomed with the local practices and traditions. This might
have been one way of maintaining a form of neutrality between the judge and the subjects
when it comes to adjudicating lawsuits. Moreover, by placing one Hanafi chief qadi, the
Ottomans ensured that the Hanafi’s position was elevated above that of the other
schools.555 Despite having abolished the plural system of the Mamluks, there were deputy
qadis (na’ibs) representing the four schools placed in each courthouse and usually served
for life.556 Likewise, being appointed to an important province served as a medium for the
chief qadi to attain higher positions in the future such as becoming kadi-‘asker.557
What is concluded from the Ottomanization of the judiciary and the introduction
of new policies is that the Ottoman authorities opted for creating a standardized system
that would be closely linked to the central government. The qadis appointed by the
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authorities were usually “trained and dispatched from the Ottoman government.” 558
Perhaps this served as a stepping-stone to infiltrate the newly appropriated territories with
“Ottomanism,” given that the appointment of qadis were not arbitrary and was based on
centralized procedural appointments highly controlled by the government.559 Another
way of standardizing judicial procedure and bringing in line the different provinces of the
empire was introducing the system of record keeping. During the Mamluks, qadis
recorded the cases in their personal documents, which they kept at home. This changed
under the Ottomans, where each courthouse had to have a register of court records drawn
up by the qadi and his assistants.560 This form of bureaucratization was once again an
effort of standardizing procedure throughout the provinces, which would make “legal
transactions…universally recognized.”561 This meant, as brought to attention by Hanna,
“a person could, in one of the courts of Cairo, buy a house in Damascus.”562
The Question of Judicial Corruption
Noel J. Coulson’s article “Doctrine and Practice in Islamic Law: One Aspect of the
Problem,” evokes the important question of judicial corruption. He argues that in the
early period of Islam, there was widespread contempt and fear amongst people of
becoming a qadi. He provides many cases that prove the extent of this aversion towards
the post, nominally as it was believed to contradict piety and moved towards “worldly
advancements and material gain.”563 That even if a qadi who has been nominated was
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pious, the post itself would lead to ruin regardless.564 Pierce explains that, “According to
Hanafi tradition, two of the school’s founding fathers had to be beaten or imprisoned
before they could be induced to accept the office of the judge.”565 This abhorrence
towards the office of the qadi might have been to an extent exaggerated; however, it still
calls into question the emphasis that was placed on the integrity of the qadi. The religious
scholars were often reluctant to accept the office of the qadi because it meant that they
were yielding to “worldly concessions” by accepting being paid in return for their
services as well as being at times challenged by producing just sentences.566 In order to
avoid bribery, qadis were forbidden to accept gifts or private invitations.567 Thus, not
only was the qualification of a qadi necessary in assuming office, but also his character.
By the same token, the Ottoman authorities placed the same emphasis on the integrity of
the qadi by entrusting him with such prerogatives as previously mentioned. Achieving
justice was in large dependent on the rectitude of the qadi.568
This daunting rhetoric of doubt of the qadi’s integrity resonated well into the
Ottoman period. In a fatwa by Ebu’s-su’ud, he implicitly emits the view that muftis are
generally considered to be of a more honorable standing than qadis seeing as that their
appointments are not dictated by a systematic judicial procedure but rather based on
eminence of their “personal qualifications;” and that their opinions are based on religious
texts unlike the sentences of the judges.569 To what extent were those the real intentions
of the fatwa of Ebu’s-su’ud as explained by Pierce could be contended. However, it still
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indicates that there was a problem in regards to the qadi’s conduct in office. It is true that
some indeed misused their positions of power. Heyd contends that the 16th Century saw
the decline of the qadi where there was a growing tendency to seek the office of the qadi;
some “even paid bribes to obtain them.”570 The corruption of the office in part emanated
from, as Heyd further argues, the lack of being paid a sufficient salary. In compliance
with the kanun, the authorities permitted the qadi to take money from recipients as free
gifts in the issuance of certificates for instance based on the recipient’s own free will.571
However, it is alleged that some qadis abused this by unlawful fees and regarding them as
otherwise on the basis that they are given as free gifts. Hence, the qadis would try to
adjudicate on as many cases as they could to obtain money.572 Moreover, they were said
to go on visits in their respective locality and usurp illegal fines and fees from people.573
There was an overall willingness of qadis to accept bribes. When it came to administering
justice and bringing offenders before the law, Heyd alleges that some qadis failed to do
so. In a case that he relates to is of a Bursa qadi in the 16th Century who refused to report
to the government the wrongdoings of robbers in his locality claiming, “I fear for my
heard.”574 Consequently, it is argued that people began to lose their trust in the judicial
system and preferred to keep some matters private rather than bringing their cases for
investigation before the qadi.575
Besides the court records, the Şikayet Defterleri (Registers of Complaints) is one
way that helps in better formulating the question of corruption of the qadi’s office. The
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extent of the qadi’s corruption and loss of integrity might be at times exaggerated.
However, the petitions brought against the qadis by state subjects produce evidence that
corruption of the judiciary did indeed exist. According to Gerber, “corruption and bribery
by judges were often viewed as the root cause of other major types of decline and
disintegration.”576 Hence the link that is often drawn between the rhetoric of decline of
the 16th Century and the disintegration of the qadis and governors.577 However, the
emphasis here is usually placed on the corruption of the qadis more than the governors,
possibly because of the significance and urgency placed on the qadi having to always
retain a just image as the prosecutor. Based on a study of the registers of complaints by
Gerber, he notes that there were 71 complaints against qadis and a much higher number
against governors. Very few of those complaints were against qadis holding office in
large cities, which indicates that there was more pressure in the central areas of the
empire on qadis maintain their integrity. However, upon examining the nature of those
complaints, Gerber concluded that there was a lack of explicit complaints sustaining that
qadis adjudicated unfairly for the sake of bribes. The bulk of complaints involved the
qadis obtaining illegal taxes. Moreover, based on his studies of thousands of Bursa court
records, Gerber argues that the qadi system was considered fair for the most part and that
the registers of complaints predominantly imply that even though there was indeed a
problem, it did not warrant deeming the whole system as corrupt.
However, two arguments could be raised here. Firstly, as noted in the previous
chapter, the process of petitioning was a costly one; thus, not everyone was capable of
sending petitions to the capital. Moreover, as Inalcik had stated, justice was considered to
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be greater near the capital,578 meaning that the far off provinces had a difficulty in
utilizing the system of petitioning. Secondly, Gerber’s study of the Bursa court records,
while they might be an accurate indication of what took place in 17th Century Bursa, it is
certainly not an accurate indication of what took place in other provinces. As such, in
order to reach the conclusion in regards to the question of judicial corruption being a
reality or not, one must venture on a closer examination of court records and other
possibly existing personal journals from different areas of the empire to deduce the reality
of the problem.
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CHAPTER 4: LAW IN PRACTICE: REGULATING
MORALITY
The recount of one of the renowned Mamluk stories, as told by Ibn Iyas and cited by
Rapoport, serves as an interesting beginning for the buildup of this chapter. In 1513,
Sultan Qanush sentenced two adulterers to death amidst altercations that took place
between himself and a number of jurists. On the 4th of December of that year, a wife of a
Hanafi deputy qadi, Ghars al-din Khalil, summoned her lover, Nur al-Din al-Mashali—a
Shafi’i deputy qadi—to her house in the absence of her husband who was expected to be
away for the whole night.579 After being informed of the visit by a neighbor, Khalil went
back to his house to find his wife in bed with al-Mashali. Refusing to be silenced by both
al-Mashali’s and Khalil’s wife’s offers of one thousand dinars and all her trousseau of
household belongings out of fear for their reputation, the infuriated Khalil locked them
both in the house and went to the military chamberlain’s court to issue a complaint
against them.580 When al-Mashali was confronted with the accusations, he confessed and
was sentenced along with Khalil’s wife to be stripped and beaten. As a sign of
humiliation, both publicly rode donkeys backwards in the city and were fined 100 dinars
each. When the wife claimed that she had no money, Khalil was ordered to pay the fine,
and was arrested when he did not.581 When Sultan al-Ghawri learnt of the story of the
adulterers, he ordered that the two be stoned in accordance with the shari’a, which was a
rather uncommon form of punishment that rarely took place at the time.582 In response,
the ulama issued a fatwa rendering the sultan’s sentence invalid on the account that al579
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Mashali had withdrawn his confession and on the basis that there was a lack of evidence
in accordance with the shari’a to prove the act of fornication took place.583 Carrying on
back and forth with the altercations between the sultan and the ulama, the latter declared
that the sultan would be legally responsible for paying blood money if the pair was
executed. Angered by the ulama, whom he called “senseless fools,” the sultan dismissed
all four qadi al-qudat and ordered the execution of al-Mashali and Khalil’s wife. Their
bodies were left to hang for two days at the house of one of the ulama who had protested
against the sultan’s sentence.584
In order to proceed with placing the story within the context of the Ottoman
framework, a few aspects of relevance here have to be taken into consideration. First off,
when Khalil was offered to settle the matter with al-Mashali between the three of them,
the former refused and still chose to take the matter to court. This is an indication that by
the 16th Century the state played an important role in regulating morality and what was
once kept within the bounds of the household. However, an important aspect has to be
contemplated here: this case involved deputy qadis who by all means, in theory, should
have possessed the highest form of integrity. Moreover, it prompted the involvement of
the sultan who showed his discontent towards the ulama for choosing a person like alMashali as a deputy qadi. Thus, it was apparently a high profile case and it does not
necessarily mean that all matters of zina (fornication) were dealt with in the same
manner. Secondly, this story is also an indication that the concept of fining the
perpetrators did exist during the Mamluks. What system of fining the Mamluks followed
or upon what basis they chose to fine the two 100 dinars is not of importance here. What
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is of relevance is that the notion of fining was used as a method of punishment. Lastly,
the lack of evidence in accordance with Islamic law seems to have served as an important
aspect of the ulama’s argumentation against the sultan’s decision for execution.
Even though the purpose here is not to offer an in depth analysis of the forms of
punishments that took place during the Mamluks, this story serves as an interesting point
of departure in understanding how the Ottoman legal system developed in terms of
regulating its subjecting and bringing the private to the public sphere. Despite the
existence of a court during the Mamluk sultanate, the degree of accessibility to
courthouses increased dramatically by the 16th Century under the Ottomans.585 This was
owed to the upsurge in the number of courthouses and their introduction for the first time
in some of the provinces of the Ottoman Empire, which encouraged more people to use
the courts in settling their disputes.586 Moreover, in regards to sentencing the offenders to
the payment of fines, this practice became an integral part in the Ottoman legal code and
was broadened to include a large number of crimes.587 It was systematized under the
Ottomans in such a way that it almost became the most common form of punishment.
Additionally, the issue of ‘evidence’ in Islamic jurisprudence when it comes to proving
cases of fornication is of significance here seeing as that it perhaps played a role in part of
the introduction of kanuns that served as a tool in policing morality.
What follows in this chapter is an in depth analysis of three Ottoman legal
innovations in the fields of marriage, zina, and prostitution that changed the course of
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regulating the public behavior.588 The previous chapters were an attempt to analyze the
introduction of certain features that took part in the establishment of the Ottoman legal
administration in order to fully grasp how law was imposed from above by the state
functionaries. This chapter will follow suit by aiming to assess the repercussions of the
implementation of the new Ottoman kanuns and to examine how society came to interact
and function within the realm of the Ottoman system of administration on the grassroot
level. Moreover, it will explicate further how the newly codified and more
comprehensive Ottoman legal codes brought about changes in the law of procedure as
well as dealt with cases that were not expanded on in the shari’a and were not easily
enforceable, bearing in mind that the regulations that will be studied here were attempts
by the Ottoman authorities to standardize the way societal behavioral patterns were dealt
with.
Marriage Fees
The Ottoman introduction of ‘fiscalized’ policies were not only limited to the type of
punishments that were prescribed against offenders. In the Ottomanization process of the
judicial system, the Ottoman authorities introduced yet another notable innovation to the
courthouses. People who went to court were now obligated to pay a fee for every case.589
A fee was designated depending on each case that came to court, and in every courthouse,
there was an Ottoman employee (shawish) who was responsible for collecting the fees.590
The fees were then divided among the indigenous staff working in the courthouse, the
Hanafi qadi al-qudat, and the sultan. Moreover, the local qadis’ incomes highly depended
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on those fees seeing as they were not paid by the state.591 This was not a novelty that was
introduced only in the Arab provinces, but in all provinces of the empire as an attempt of
standardizing the law of procedure.592 One reason for the introduction of this policy that
Hanna gives is that “perhaps because the Ottoman officials wanted the judiciary system
to pay for itself.”593 This serves as one example of imposing changes on society that was
not welcomed by the state’s subjects. Not only were people forced to pay a fee when
going to court, they were enjoined by law to bring certain cases to be registered by the
court.594 Marriage was one such case.
Every shari’a court by law became responsible for recording and registering
contracts and all forms of dealings that came before the court. 595 Registering and
applying a fee for marriage contracts was the first type of fees to be instilled by the
court.596 This was certainly an Ottoman innovation that was unheard of in Islam. There is
no record in the shari’a doctrine that necessitates the drawing up of a marriage contract,
let alone for marriage to be registered by a court.597 In Islam, a marriage was regarded as
a private form of agreement that entailed “a silver ring or a recitation from the Qur’an as
an adequate fee.”598 It neither required any judicial involvement in drawing up a marriage
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nor did it require a marriage to be registered in any way.599 In one of the fatwa of Ebu’ssu’ud, he reiterates the obligatory registration of marriage. The fatwa is as follows:
Q: Now that a Sultanic decree has been issued [commanding] that no
marriage be concluded without the cognizance of a judge, is a marriage
[concluded] without such a cognizance valid?
A: No, lest it give rise to dispute and litigation.600
This might have been one way of administering and controlling the local judicial systems
and bringing them in line with those of the other provinces.601 Perhaps another reason is,
as implied from the fatwa of Ebu’s-su’ud, that the registration of marriage acted as a form
of evidence in case disputes broke out.602 Moreover, it is noteworthy to underline here
that consummating marriages through formal means by state officials served as a way of
regulating societal behavioral patterns. Even if that was not the chief reason, the changes
instituted acted as a method of preventing “irregular or illicit unions”603 and regulating
the public’s morality. Thus, the Ottoman state was bringing the institution of marriage
from the private to the public sphere and restraining the subjects’ sexual conduct.
What effects did those changes have on the public is of significance here. Taking
on the case of Egypt, one can discern how the class of ulama reacted to the innovations
introduced by the Ottoman authorities. With the state taking up the role of regulating
public morality, the indigenous ulama were marginalized. When it came to matters of
administering justice, the ulama in Egypt were greatly impacted by the Ottoman
conquests of 1517. The innovations laid out by the Ottoman authorities did not only
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restrict the ulama in the sphere of drawing up marriages—who they regarded as an illegal
form of taxation—, but also negatively effected them in regards to appointing one Hanafi
qadi al-qudat, who was higher in rank than the local deputy qadis.604 As such, a number
of qadis were dismissed from their posts. Moreover, there was growing fear that the other
schools of law besides the official Hanafi madhhab would be discontinued and that the
Ottoman kanun would replace the shari’a.605
Even though those might have all been attempts to centralize state power in the
provinces and to unify the legal administration, the changes introduced were met with
great discontent and it was not a challenge-free process on the part of the Ottomans.
When it came to the unwelcomed innovation of marriage, both the Azhar and Syrian
ulama came to regard the imposition of marriage fees as a fitna “to which no other fitna
could be compared.”606 They believed that marriage was not a matter of the judiciary.607
What further constituted part of the ulama’s disgruntlement was also the fact that
registering marriages in a court or through Ottoman functionaries meant that the local
ulama became deprived of the profits they acquired from drawing up marriages. This was
not a matter that they could overlook and hence brought their complaints to the
authorities. Selim I, who was sultan at the time, dismissed the deputy qadis in response
along with their witnesses and appointed an Ottoman qadi al-qudat (known as qadi al‘Arab) to preside over the court and to oversee the legal administration, and who also in
turn appointed witnesses of his own choosing.608 A part from those mentioned earlier
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whom the court paid for, the newly appointed witnesses also received money from the
revenue generated by the marriage fees.609 Despite no longer retaining the role of drawing
up marriages, some ulama continued to do so in secret.610 However, when a Shafi’i
deputy qadi drew up a marriage contract in secret against the decrees of the sultan, “he
was beaten by the Ottoman judge and paraded bare-headed through the streets of
Cairo.” 611 What further escalated the tensions was that several ulama were sent to
Istanbul in what was regarded as them being exiled.612 Moreover, seeing as that by 1521,
the deputy qadis and the witnesses were still not allowed to sit in the Salihiyya madrasa,
marriage contracts were concluded in the houses of one of the deputy judges.613 However,
the Ottoman authorities tight control was seen even in overseeing the process of
concluding a marriage. Troops and representatives assigned by the chief of police were
ordered to sit outside the houses of the four deputy qadis and collect the fees from the
marriage contracts concluded.614 The fee of a virgin bride in local currency was set at 60
nisfs, while that of a previously married woman was set at 30 nisfs.615 Furthermore, a
hundred ulama took to the governor of Egypt at the time, Kha’ir Bey, entreating him to
retract the fees on marriage, which they believed to have completely contradicted the
shari’a. However, he dismissed their appeals. 616 Thus, they challenged the newly
enacted decrees by withholding to marry or divorce anyone and an Azhari shakykh even
went as far as referring to what was known as al-yasaq al-uthmani (Ottoman provisions)
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as yasaq al-kufr. He was imprisoned as a result but was later set free when the ulama
intervened.617
Further changes took place in Egypt after Suleyman I became sultan. Under the
provisions of new sultanic decrees, a kadi-‘asker was ordered to “replace the four
Egyptian deputy judges and discharge judicial business on behalf of all four Sunni
schools of law.” This once again reconfigured the structure of the deputy qadis and their
witnesses. The new laws dictated the appointment of one deputy qadi from each
madhhab with two witnesses instead of ten for each qadi. Furthermore, any judicial
business that does not first go through the kadi’-asker would be invalidated.618 The
appointment of the deputy qadis was the prerogative of the kadi-‘asker who ordered them
to sit in the Salihiyya madrasa with the Hanafi deputy qadi in charge of overseeing and
monitoring all judicial matters.619 However, seeing the growing discontent of the local
ulama, the government attempted to make concessions by lowering the marriage fees and
dividing them on the basis of two categories. A virgin bride from the ‘common’ class was
to pay 43 nisfs while a divorcée or a widow was to pay 22 nisfs in addition to other fees
that would go to the witnesses and qadis involved in drawing up the contract.620
Cutting down on marriage fees served as a temporary solution. The changes
introduced by the new kanunnames were met with opposition. People were resisting the
novelties that the Ottoman practices injected their society with. Abdul-Karim Rafeq notes
that, “marriage procedures became so complicated that people preferred to remain
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single.”621 One other possible reason for institutionalizing marriage was perhaps owed to
the fact that with the legal plural system that existed under the Mamluk four qadi alqudat, people exploited that they could maneuver around with the madhhabs: getting
married in accordance to one and divorced the next day in accordance to another based on
what was more of benefit to them. With the new fees imposed, not everyone could afford
getting married and people grew more reluctant to do so. Thus, as a result, a class in
society disappeared from the marriage scene.
Zina (Fornication)
The early codification of kanun aimed to deal with cases that were not clearly established
in the shari’a and attempted to create forms of punishments that could be readily
enforceable. With the creation of a more comprehensive and elaborative criminal code,
the kanunnames of Suleyman I and his predecessors allowed for the state to play an
integral role in the way justice was administered through covering a broader range of
criminal transgressions where the shari’a fell short.622 What is of importance to examine
here is how the state became so involved in sexual discourse and how morality was
regulated through publicizing what was once private. The controversial case of zina
serves as one example of how the state policed the sexual arena vis-à-vis the kanun.
Zina is illegal sexual intercourse that occurs outside marriage or concubinage.
According to the shari’a doctrine, zina is one of the crimes that fall under the hudud
punishments that entail lashing or stoning to death.623 A man commits zina when he
engages in sexual intercourse with someone other than his four wives or concubines,
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while a woman does so when she engages in intercourse with someone other than her
husband.624 Gender, marital status, class, age, and religion play an important role in
categorizing how zina is dealt with. In compliance with the laws of the shari’a, it makes a
difference if the offender was: man or woman; married or unmarried; free or slave; adult
or minor; or Muslim or non-Muslim.625
The Hanafi legal tradition lays down a number of provisions that deal with zina.
When it comes to the issue of evidence, the Hanafi doctrine takes into account the
testimony of four well-reputed male witnesses.626 They must specify where, when, how,
and what took place exactly before the qadi as well as identify the woman. When it has
been established that the woman was prohibited to the offender and that the witnesses
witnessed what took place “like the mascara-stick in the mascara-pot,” then the qadi can
pass his sentence.627 If the witnesses giving the testimony are less than four, then they are
considered slanders; and if they retract their testimony before the stoning takes place, the
sentence is reverted and they (the slanders) become liable for the hadd of slander. If the
stoning had already taken place, the ‘slanders’ are liable for the diya (blood money).628
When it comes to the confession of the offender, the Hanafi law requires that he be a sane
and mature man who is then asked to testify four times on four different occasions. The
sentence of the hadd penalty is passed only when that happens. However, if the offender
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retracts his confession before the execution of the punishment, he is set free and is no
longer liable for hadd punishment.629
It is obvious that the Hanafi doctrine required strict proofs in order to establish
that a crime of zina had been committed. There is a lot of ambiguity that surrounds zina
when dealing with it in accordance with the shari’a law. It was difficult to establish how
to move forward with prosecuting such a crime seeing as that the requirement of four
witnesses to be present during the act itself and for all of them to be well-reputed men is
rendered almost impossible. Furthermore, the fact that for a confession to be considered
viable, the offender had to confess four different times makes it all the more difficult to
make a conviction. One can infer that such mechanisms of ambiguity utilized by the
Hanafi law were meant to keep sexual matters private and difficult to penalize. Another
aspect that contributed to the ambiguity surrounding zina is the issue of quasi-ownership
of concubines (shubhat al-milk). A man can make a number of claims over the ownership
of women who are not his wives or concubines. One such claim is that a female slave
might have been awarded to him as a pledge; thus, it is licit to commit sexual intercourse
with her.630
The issue of same-sex intercourse is not dealt with clearly in the shari’a doctrine.
It is not included in the penalties prescribed to zina. Thus, there have been a lot of
deliberations surrounding this matter where some jurists believed that devising analogy
could not be applied in the case of homosexual intercourse.631 According to Abu Hanifa
nonetheless, he deduced that, by analogy, homosexual intercourse could be dealt with the
same as heterosexual intercourse. However, male homosexual intercourse was still not
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treated as a hadd offence.632 Some jurists believed that same-sex intercourse merited
execution, while others believed that repentance was sufficient enough for eliminating the
enforcement of punishment.633 However, the shari’a deals differently with female acts of
homosexuality. Seeing as that no act of intercourse occurs, female homosexual acts are
not categorized as zina and bears no form of punishment. Yet, Jurists generally condemn
such practices wherein some believe that such they warrant a qadi’s discretionary
punishment.634
Elyse Semerdjian argues that, “Ottoman law differs so drastically from the shari’a
on the subject of punishment that one may speculate that it was an attempt to reconcile
the law with the needs of the empire’s diverse population.”635 It is here that the Ottomans
introduced new principles in dealing with the crime of zina. There was great emphasis
placed on the crimes of sexual transgressions in the kanunnames of Suleyman I and his
predecessors. The opening chapter of the Ottoman Criminal Code is titled “On
Fornication and Other Offences.”636 It is noteworthy that there were still attempts to
conform to the shari’a provisions in which the kanun maintained that an offender is
punished according with its regulations only in case he was not punished under the
shari’a first. The kanun also differentiates between different genders, classes and age as
the shari’a does. 637 The kanun offers a distinctive form of punishment when it
implements a penalty of affixed fines in dealing with zina set in the 35 articles of the
Ottoman Criminal Code instead of the fixed hudud punishments prescribed by the shari’a
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in case of conviction.638 Heyd maintains that the shift from the hudud punishments to the
punishment by fines is owed to Abu Yusuf’s argument that a ruler was allowed to “inflict
discretionary punishment by taking money.”639 Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier the
shari’a doctrine mostly prescribes either flogging or stoning to death to crimes of zina.
However, the kanunnames replaced the hudud punishments with the lighter punishment
of fines. It did not enforce the death penalty on crimes of sexual transgressions. However,
there were more severe punishments that were imposed on offenders who committed rape
or abduction such as castration.640
There were five factors to be considered when it comes to determining the scale
of a fine: “wealth, personal status, age, servile status, and religion.”641 A Muslim man or
woman who is wealthy, free, and married are obligated to pay the highest fine of 300
akçes, whereas a poor slave man is compelled to pay 25 akçes for the same crime.642 The
practice of male homosexual intercourse is fined by way of the same scale. Nonetheless,
under the kanun, female homosexual acts were not considered as a felony.643 Another
difference between the kanun and the shari’a in regards to the regulation of zina is that an
adulterous married woman must be divorced from her husband in accordance with the
shari’a. However, the kanun necessitates that a husband must pay a fine if he chooses to
stay married to his adulterous wife.644 According to Article 6 of the Ottoman Criminal
Code, a man must thus pay 100 for his wife “by way of fine [imposed] on a [consenting]
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cuckold,” and 300 akçes for himself. If he is of average standing, he is entitled to pay 50
akçes and if he is poor he ought to pay 40 or 30 akçes.645
Shubha (resemblance) was yet another principle that the kanun utilized to deal
with zina. Following a Hadith by Prophet Muhammad—“Ward off the fixed punishments
from the Muslims on the strength of shubha as much as you can”646—shubha can be used
as a method where there is judicial doubt to avoid being punished for zina. In such case,
the offender usually claims that he believed that the act was licit. This happens just as in
the case of quasi-ownership of a female slave, or if the woman and man involved believe
they were legally married and there was no intention for them to commit zina.647 In
Ottoman law, for the act to be considered a crime, the offender has to have intent or prior
knowledge of the act he is committing. 648 This follows the shari’a endorsement of
shubha where in case a man retracts his confession, he is prompted to say: “Perhaps there
was shubha, or [I] only kissed, or touched her.”649 This principle was often used and
encouraged by jurists as a loophole in order to avoid punishment.
Ottoman fatwas played a role besides the kanun in regulating public morality and
the sexual arena. A number of fatwas by the seyhulislam Ebu’s-su’ud is concerned with
crimes of sexual transgressions. One of his fatwas considers rape as zina and prescribes
the hadd punishment for it in conformity with the shari’a:
Q: If Zeyd without being married to Hind takes her by force, what should
happen to Zeyd?
645

Heyd, Old Ottoman Criminal Law, p. 96-97; Ze’evi, Producing Desire, p. 64; and Pierce, Leslie.
“Seniority, Sexuality, and Social Order: The Vocabulary of Gender in Early Modern Ottoman Society,” in
Women in The Ottoman Empire: Middle Eastern Women in the Early Modern Era. Eds. Madeline C. Zilfi.
Leiden: Brill, 1997, p. 169-196.
646
Ze’evi, Producing Desire, p. 30.
647
Ibid., 32.
648
Ibid.
649
Imber, Ebu’s-Su’ud, p. 25.

135

A: If he is a muhsan [a married Muslim], he will be killed.650
Another rather compelling fatwa here legalizes a woman’s killing of her husband by
poisoning him if he divorces her and tries to commit zina with her by force. In such case,
she is not liable for the payment of blood money, as poisoning her husband would be
considered a case of self-defense:651
Q: Zeyd says, “If I do this thing, may my wife be divorced three time.” He
then does it. His wife knows this, but is unable to prove it. Is Zeyd’s wife a
sinner because Zeyd is intimate with her?
A: It is fornication (zina). It is essential that she does not [submit]
voluntarily [to Zeyd’s embrace]. She must give what she has and there
must be a khul’ divorce. If he tries to have intercourse [with her] and there
is no other means of escape, it is licit according to the shari’a to add
poison to his food. She would not commit a sin and there is no diya (blood
money).652
There are a number of differences in the way kanun and shari’a deal with crimes of
sexual transgressions that one could recognize. Intent associated with guilt was one
aspect that was considered in Ottoman law. If a person breaks into a house without
committing any offence, he is still considered guilty if he had the intent of committing a
crime.653 Following the same line of reasoning, if a man is found in a house alone with a
woman then it is assumed that their intent was to commit zina in spite of whatever action
was taking place. This point is different from the shari’a given that “seeing” and
“touching” could be considered zina in accordance with Islamic legal provisions.654
Another major aspect that underpins the dissimilarities between both legal codes is the
imposition of fines. As mentioned in earlier chapters, one of the possible reasons behind
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the Ottoman ‘fiscalized’ forms of punishments might have been owed to the fact that they
were a source of revenue. Some crimes are punishable by both a form of discretionary
punishment and a monetary fine, as shown in Article 22 of the Ottoman Criminal Code:
“If a person has sexual intercourse with his wife’s female slave or with his
mother’s or father’s female slave or with his wife after having divorced
[her] irrevocably, the cadi shall chastise [him] and a fine of two akçe shall
be collected for each stroke.”655
It is important to note here that even though the fatwas of Ebu’s-su’ud often seem to
prescribe of a hadd punishment, this was not necessarily what was applied in court. Heyd
argues that, “Stoning to death, though prescribed in many Ottoman fatwas as the required
penalty for certain cases of fornication, seems to have been inflicted only in very rare
cases.”656 Thus, it seems that Ottoman law aimed at creating a more enforceable system
of legal procedure that at times broke away from the essence of the shari’a.
Prostitution
Prostitution fell under the category of zina and was the subject of a lot of juristic
deliberations. In Hanafi Legal doctrine, there have been many endeavors aimed at trying
to pinpoint what type of crimes of sexual transgressions constituted the hadd
punishments.657 Seeing the rigidity set forth by the shari’a in establishing a crima of zina,
Hanafi jurists often attempts to limit the scope of what dictates a crime that necessitates a
hadd penalty. Some were even of the opinion that such indecencies should be concealed
so long as a case of zina could not be proven.658 One of the few cases where the shari’a
provisions enforced a fixed punishment of eighty lashes was slander (qadhf)—falsely
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accusing someone of committing fornication.659 However, when it comes to prostitution,
Hanafi jurists did not consider the case as an offence that infringed on hudud Allah. As
mentioned above, there is a lot of ambiguity that surrounds the cases of zina and how to
deal with them. Hanafi jurists were reluctant in stipulating that certain cases would be
deemed as zina. As such, they were of the opinion that at times illicit practices could bear
a resemblance to licit practices, and on the occasion that the legality of a case of zina is
questioned, then the fixed punishment could not be imposed.660
Prostitution is a case in point. Seeing as that it involves some form of payment for
sexual intercourse paid by a client, it bears resemblance to the payment of a dowry
required by marriage or concubinage where a husband entertains his sexual rights.661
Hence, there is shubha when it comes to outlining the legality of prostitution that would
not necessarily incur the fixed penalty. The ambiguity is caused, as argued by the Hanafi
jurists, when a man says the words “I give your this dowry in order to commit zina with
you.”662 According to jurists, this would be an obvious crime transgressing hudud Allah
and would require the hadd punishment.663 Hence, the shari’a provisions are not explicit
in respect to whether prostitution is deemed as an illegal or legal act. According to a 17th
Century Ottoman jurist, he argues that, “sex for hire did not warrant the hadd punishment
required for zina;”664 thus, it was a more complicated crime to establish than zina.
Furthermore, the Hanafi legal doctrine also dictates that, “if a man hires a woman to
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fornicate with her and does so…is subject to ta’zir. 665 Hence, there were no
comprehensible legal codes that substantiate how prostitution should be dealt with.
However, prostitution also raised a number of questions other than committing illicit
sexual intercourse, which are: procuring, soliciting, public indecency, human trafficking,
and disrupting of neighborhood security, which might have made it all the more difficult
to deal with.666
Under the Ottoman Criminal Code, prostitution was not only a matter of
committing sexual transgressions, but it was also regarded as a social and moral issue. It
is dealt with in Chapters II (On Mutual Beating and Abuse, Killing and the Fines for
Them) and III (On Fines and [Capital or Severe Corporal] Punishment for the Drinking of
Wine, Theft, and Robbery and [other] Transgressions, Etc) of Suleyman I’s
kanunname.667 According to Article 57:
“If a person practices procuring, the cadi shall chastise [him or her] and
expose [him or her to public scorn; in addition] a fine of one akçe shall be
collected for each stroke.”668
However, there are no explicit provisions in the kanunname stipulating specific
punishments to prostitutes or their clients. As mentioned in Article 57, procuring is the
case often dealt with more clearly in the kanun. Other than being sentenced to a form of
discretionary punishment and a payment for each stroke, the offender committing
procurement is also punished by being subjected to branding of the forehead or public
scorn.669 Another kanun provision dealt with the issue of disrupting of the neighborhood,
which was considered to be within the scope of prostitution. Members of a neighborhood
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could appeal to court that a given person, who was considered as either a criminal or
indecent, be banished from the neighborhood.670
James Baldwin states that, “banishment from a neighborhood, rather than corporal
and pecuniary punishments mentioned elsewhere in the kanunname and in fatwas, was by
far the most common response to prostitution.”671 When members of a neighborhood
came forth in seeking the banishment of a certain individual or a group of individuals,
former were not obliged to prove beyond doubt that a person has committed prostitution
or procurement or that any sexual transgressions had occurred.672 The kanun granted the
right to members of the neighborhood community to request the banishment of certain
individuals whom believed disrupted the security of the neighborhood with their acts.
However, the plaintiffs had to be careful with the language that they used in their appeal
before the court so they would avoid being accused of slander (qahdf) and would not be
sentenced to a punishment of eighty lashes. They rather chose to use certain ambiguous
terms, such as “off the straight path,” to hint at the sexual misconduct or immorality of a
person.673
Prostitution was also reflected in the fatwas of Ebu’s-su’ud. In this fatwa, the
seyhulislam deals with prostitution as a crime of zina:
Q: If a group makes it a custom to go from village to village, causing their
wives, daughters and female slaves to commit fornication, what is their
sentence according to the shari’a?
A: They should all, without exception, suffer an extremely severe
chastisement and not be released from prison until their reform becomes
evident. Those women whose fornication is proven should all be stoned.674
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It is interesting to note here that according to the Bursa court records examined by
Gerber, the bulk of the cases dealing with prostitution all asserted that the prostitutes
were caught committing the act of zina. However, even though the obvious shari’a hadd
penalty was either flogging or stoning to death, none of the cases demonstrate that such
punishments were enforced. In most cases, the prostitute is either banished from the
neighborhood or subjected to discretionary punishment.675
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Conclusion
As seen in the previous chapters, the doctrine of the shari’a to a large degree was
broadened by the regulations set forth by the kanun. The way law was imposed from
above by the state and dealt with on the grassroot level of society serves as a mixture of
the two legal codes. However, the question that remains, to what extent did it matter
which law was applied? Aside from the clear-cut innovations that the sharia introduced in
the Ottoman legal process, people were presenting their cases before the court knowing
full-handedly that they now had a place to bring their private matters into the public
sphere. Even though the imposition of new Ottoman policies was at times met with
opposition, the court became an integral element in people’s daily lives. It served as the
nexus between state and society where it mediated almost all types of cases ranging from
crimes, to family, to taxes, etc. According to Hanna, “Justice was quick and simple.
There were no long delays and no complicated procedures.”676 To know the extent of the
viability of this requires a more closer and comprehensive study of court records in the
core areas of the empire as compared to the provincial areas to have a clearer
understanding of the day-to-day interactions of the people. Unfortunately, though the
court records provide for a rich historical authority, they are still lacking in some respects
wherein the full dimensions of the cases were not explicated and only the basic
summaries and highlights were records. Nevertheless, they have been the commanding
form of evidence when it comes to the history of the Ottoman Empire.
The innovations in the Ottoman legal administration constituted a fundamental
portion of Ottoman history. The loosening of laws to accommodate contemporary
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practices and place them within the confines of the law through practicality, adaptability
and flexibility reconfigured the entire structure of Ottoman legal thought. There have
been many contributions and efforts by the state functionaries to reconcile the kanun with
the shari’a. However, Ottoman legal provisions retained a more pragmatic character than
that of the shari’a as certain cases under the latter’s doctrinal traditions were not
expanded on or were not quite clear. Thus, the kanun could be regarded as having served
as an extension of the shari’a in dealing with more contemporary issues under the
justification of the maslaha of society. As such, Baldwin alleges that the way qadi courts
came to deal with certain crimes in regulating society “cannot be characterized as the
non-application of Islamic law.” 677 However, when examining the kanun-shari’a
discourse, one has to consider that the shari’a has been interpreted in a number of ways
and there have been a lot of efforts in circumventing certain legal Islamic regulations to
make ends meet. This goes back to the idea that Islam is not the same everywhere.
The Empire was keep to bring in line all its provinces together and create a
nucleus of centralized power through standardizing and unifying the law of procedure
and the judicial system throughout the empire. The Ottoman authorities were keen to
enjoin their subjects to adjust to the new innovations, and the kanun served as a tool in
doing so. A way to impose the state’s hegemony was by making people accountable for
their actions before the law and by integrating them into the judicial system. Nonetheless,
people had little choice by to adapt and adopt the Ottoman modifications injected into
their societies. The degree of power that the state exercised by the 16th Century over large
territories with extended frontiers and a more diverse population was one way to enforce
its hegemony. For the continuation of an empire over a number of centuries, despite
677
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elements of decline, it had to become a pervasive force of change. Even though there was
a process of secularization taking place in adopting the newly codified Ottoman laws,
there was always the dichotomy between law and application—theory and practice—that
the state was faced with; hence the many efforts of reconciliation and attempts to create a
symbiosis of legal codes. However, as Heyd clearly puts it, “the kanun is conceived as a
supplement to the shari’a, theoretically inferior to it but prevailing over it in practice.”678
Despite the attempts of the empire to retain its religiosity, there were constant ventures to
make the law more adaptable and pragmatic.

678

Heyd, Old Ottoman Criminal Law.

144

Bibliography
Abdal-Rehim, Abdal-Rehim Abdal-Rahman. “The Family and Gender Laws in Egypt
During the Ottoman Period,” in Women, the Family, and Divorce Laws in Islamic
History. Eds. Amira El Azhary Sonbol. Syracuse University Press, 1996, p. 96-111.
Abou-El-Haj, Rifa’at ‘Ali. Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire,
Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2005.
Al-Atafy, Alia. “Rasm ‘aqd al-zawaj fi al-‘asr al-‘uthmani bayn al-muwafaqa wal rafd.”
Al Ruzname: The Egyptian Documentary Annals, No. 10 (2012): 353-382.
Al-Mawardi, Abu’l-Hassan, Al-Ahkam As-Sultaniyyah: The Laws of Islamic Governance.
Baldwin, James E. “Petitioning the Sultan in Ottoman Egypt.” Bulletin of the School of
Oriental and African Studies 75, no. 3 (2012): 499–524.
------.“Prostitution, Islamic Law and Ottoman Societies.” Journal of the Economic and
Social History of the Orient 55 (2012): 117-152.
Bulliet, Richard W. “The Shaikh Al-Islam and the Evolution of Islamic Society.” Studia
Islamica, No. 35 (1972):
Burak, Guy. “The Second Formation of Islamic Law: The Post Mongol Context of the
Ottoman Adoption of a School of Law.” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 55:
3 (2013): 579-602.
------. The Second Formation of Islamic Law: The Hanafi School in the Early Modern
Ottoman Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Calder, Norman. Islamic Jurisprudence in the Classical Era. Eds. Colin Imber. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Coulson, Noel J. “Doctrine and Practice in Islamic Law: One Aspect of the
Problem.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of
London 18, no. 2 (1956): 211-26.
-----. A History of Islamic Law. Edinburgh, 1964.
Ergene, Bogaç A. "On Ottoman Justice: Interpretations in Conflict (1600-1800)." Islamic
Law and Society 8, no. 1 (2001): 52-87.
------."Pursuing Justice in an Islamic Context: Dispute Resolution in Ottoman Courts of
Law." Political and Legal Anthropology Review 27, no. 1 (2004): 51-71.
------.Local Court, Community and Justice in the 17th-and 18th-Century Ottoman Empire.
Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of History, Ohio State University, 2001.
145

Fleet, Kate, “Ottoman Expansion in the Mediterranean,” in The Cambridge History of
Turkey, 2: The Ottoman Empire as a World Power, 1453-1603. Eds. Suraiya N. Faroqhi
and Kate Fleet. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Fodor, Pal. “Sultan, Imperial Divan, Grand Vizier: Changes in the Ottoman Ruling Elite
and the Formation of the Grand Vizieral “TELḪĪṢ.” Acta Orientalia Academiae
Scientiarum Hungaricae, Vol. 47, No. 1/2 (1994): 67-85.
Geertz, Clifford. Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology. New
York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1983.
Gerber, Haim, Islamic Law and Culture, 1600-1840. Leiden: Boston, 1999.
------. "The Muslim Law of Partnerships in Ottoman Court Records." Studia Islamica, no.
53 (1981): 109-19.
------. “Sharia, Kanun and Custom in the Ottoman Law: The Court Records of 17thCentury Bursa.” International Journal of Turkish Studies, Vol. 2, no. 1 (1981): 131-147.
------. State, Society, and Law in Islam: Ottoman Law in Comparative Perspective.
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.
Göçek, Fatma. “The Social Construction of an Empire: Ottoman State Under Suleyman
the Magnificent,” in Suleyman the Second and His Time. Eds. Halil Inalcik and Cemal
Kafadar. Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1993.
Gradeva, Rossita. “On Judicial Hierarchy in the Ottoman Empire: The Case of Sofia from
the Seventeenth to the Beginning of the Eighteenth Century,” in Dispensing Justice in
Islam: Qadis and their Judgments. Eds. Muhammad Khalid Masud, Rudolph Peters, and
David S. Powers. Leiden: Brill, 2006, pp. 271-298.
Hallaq, Wael B. “The Judiciary Coming of Age,” in The origins and evolution of Islamic
law. Vol. 1. Cambridge University Press, (2005): 79-101
------. "Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?" International Journal of Middle East Studies 16,
no. 1 (1984): 3-41.
Hanna, Nelly. “The Administration of Courts in Ottoman Cairo,” in The State and its
Servants: Administration in Egypt from Ottoman Times to the Present. Ed. Nelly Hanna.
Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, (1995): 45-59.
------. “Marriage among Merchant Families in Seventeenth-Century Egypt,” in Women,
the Family, and Divorce Laws in Islamic History. Eds. Amira El Azhary Sonbol.
Syracuse University Press, 1996, p. 143-154.
Hakan, Karateke. “Opium for the Subjects? Religiosity as Legitimizing Factor for the
Ottoman Sultan,” in Legitimizing the order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power. Ed.
Hakan and Reinkowski. Leiden Brill, 2005.
146

Hathaway, Jane and Karl K. Barbir. The Arab Lands Under Ottoman Rule, 1516-1800.
London: Pearson PLC, 2008.
Heyd, Uriel. “Some Aspects of the Ottoman Fetva.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental
and African Studies, University of London, Vol. 32, No. 1 (1969): 35-56.
------. Studies in old Ottoman Criminal Law. Ed. V.L. Menage. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1973.
Hoexter, Miriam. “Qadi, Mufti and Ruler: Their Roles in The Development of Islamic
Law,” in Law, Custom and Statue in the Muslim World. Ed. by Ron Shaham. Boston:
Brill, 2007.
Imber, Colin. “Government, administration and law,” in The Cambridge History of
Turkey, Volume 2: The Ottoman Empire as a World Power, 1453-1603. Eds. Suraiya N.
Faroqhi and Kate Fleet. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
------. Ebu’s-Su’ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1997.
------. The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power. New York & London:
Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2002.
Inalcik, Halil. “Suleiman the Lawgiver and Ottoman Law,” in Islamic Political Thought
and Governance: Critical Concepts in Political Science, Volume II. Eds. Abdullah Saeed.
New York: Routledge, 2011.
------. “State, Sovereignty and Law During the Reign of Suleyman,” in Suleyman the
Second and His Time. Eds. Halil Inalcik and Cemal Kafadar. Istanbul: The Isis Press,
1993, pp. 59-92.
------. The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600. Translated by Norman
Itzkowitz and Colin Imber, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973.
Jackson, Sherman. “The Primacy of Domestic Policy: Ibn Bint Al-Aazz and the
Establishment of Four Chief Judgeships in Mamluk Egypt.” Journal of the American
Oriental Society, 115 (1995): 52-64.
Jennings, Ronald C. “Kadi, Court, and Legal Procedure in 17th C. Ottoman Kayseri: The
Kadi and the Legal System.” Studia Islamica, No. 48 (1978): 133-172.
------. "Limitations of the Judicial Powers of the Kadi in 17th C. Ottoman
Kayseri." Studia Islamica, no. 50 (1979): 151-84.
------. "Women in Early 17th Century Ottoman Judicial Records: The Sharia Court of
Anatolian Kayseri." Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 18, no. 1
(1975): 53-114.

147

Khoury, Dina Rizk. "Administrative Practice between Religious Law (Shari'a) and State
Law (Kanun) on the Eastern Frontiers of the Ottoman Empire." Journal of Early Modern
History 5, no. 4 (2001): 305-330.
Kuran, Timur, ed., Social and Economic Life in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul: Glimpses
from Court Records, vol. 4, State–Subject Relations (1661–97). Istanbul: Türkiye İş
Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2011.
Lybyer, Albert Howe. The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman
the Magnificent. New York: Russell & Russell, 1966.
Mandaville, Jon E. "The Ottoman Court Records of Syria and Jordan." Journal of the
American Oriental Society 86, no. 3 (1966): 311-19.
------. “Usurious Piety: The Cash Waqf Controversy in the Ottoman Empire,” IJMES, 10,
3 (1979): 289-308.
Masud, Khalid, Rudolph Peters, and David S. Powers. “Qadis and their Courts: An
Historical Survey,” in Dispensing Justice in Islam: Qadis and their Judgments. Eds.
Muhammad Khalid Masud, Rudolph Peters, and David S. Powers. Leiden: Brill, 2006.
Michael M. Pixley. "The Development and Role of the Ṣeyhülislam in Early Ottoman
History." Journal of the American Oriental Society 96, no. 1 (1976): 89-96.
Neş'et Çaǧatay. "Ribā and Interest Concept and Banking in the Ottoman Empire." Studia
Islamica, no. 32 (1970): 53-68.
Peters, Rudolph. “What Does it Mean to Be an Official Madhhab? Hanafism and the
Ottoman Empire,” in The Islamic School of Law: Evolution, Devolution, and Progress.
Eds. Peri Baerman, Rudolph Peters, and Frank E. Vogel. Cambridge MA: Harvard
University Press, 2005, pp. 147-158.
------. Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth to
the Twenty-first Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Pierce, Leslie. “A New Judge for Aintab: The Shifting Legal environment of a SixteenthCentury Ottoman Court,” in Dispensing Justice in Islam: Qadis and their Judgments.
Eds. Muhammad Khalid Masud, Rudolph Peters, and David S. Powers. Leiden: Brill,
2006, pp. 71-94.
------. Morality Tales: Law and Gender in the Ottoman Court of Aintab. Berkley:
University of California Press, 2003.
Pixley, Michael M. “The Development and Role of the Seyhulislam in Early Ottoman
History.” Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 96, No. 1 (1976): 89-96.
Rafeq, Abdul-Karim. “The Application of Islamic Law in the Ottoman Courts in
Damascus: The Case of the Rental of the Waqf Land,” in Dispensing Justice in Islam:
148

Qadis and their Judgments. Eds. Muhammad Khalid Masud, Rudolph Peters, and David
S. Powers. Leiden: Brill, 2006, pp. 411-426.
------. “The Opposition of the Azhar ‘Ulama to Ottoman Laws and its Significance in the
History of Ottoman Egypt.” In Etudes sur les Villes du Proche-Orient. XVIe-XIXe
Siecle, 2001, p. 43-54. Damascus: Institut français d’études arabes de Damas.
------. “The Syrian ‘Ulama, Ottoman Law, and Islamic Sharia.” Turcica, Revue d’Etudes
Turques, vol. 26, 1994, p-9-32.
Rapoport, Yossef. “Legal Diversity in the Age of Taqlid. The Four Chief Qadis under the
Mamluks,” Islamic Law and Society 10 (2003): 210-228.
------. “Royal Justice and Religious Law: Siyasah and Shariah under the Mamluks.”
Mamlūk Studies Review Vol16, No. 1 (2012): 71-102.
------. “Women and Gender in Mamluk Society: An Overview.” The Middle East
Documentation Center, 2007, p. 1-47.
Reinhart, A. Kevin. “Transcendence and Social Practice: Muftis and Qadis as Religious
Interpreters,” in Islamic Political Thought and Governance: Critical Concepts in
Political Science, Volume III. Eds. Abdullah Saeed. New York: Routledge, 2011.
Repp, Richard C. “Qanun and Shari’a in the Ottoman Context,” in Islamic Law: Social
and Historical Contexts. Ed. Aziz Al-Azmeh. New York: Routledge (1988): 124-145.
------. The Mufti of Istanbul: A Study in the Development of the Ottoman Learned
Hierarchy. London: Ithaca Press, 1986.
Rosen, Lawrence. The Anthropology of Justice: Law as Culture in Islamic Society. New
York: Cambridge University Press: 1989.
Sahin, Kaya. “Imperialism, Bureaucratic Consciousness, and the Historian’s Craft,”
in Writing History at the Ottoman Court: Editing the Past, Fashioning the Future. Eds.
H. E. Cipa and E. Fetvaci. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013, pp. 39-57.
------. Empire and Power in the Reign of Suleyman: Narrating the Sixteenth Century
Ottoman World. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Schacht, Joseph. An Introduction to Islamic Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964.
Semerdjian, Elyse, “Off the Straight Path”: Illicit Sex, Law, and Community in Ottoman
Aleppo. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2008.
Shahar, Ido. “Legal Pluralism and the Study of Shariʿa Courts.” Islamic Law and
Society 15, no. 1 (2008): 112-41.

149

Sonbol, Amira El-Azhary. “History of Marriage Contracts in Egypt,” Hawwa 3, 2 (2005):
159-196.
Tucker, Judith E. In the House of the Law: Gender and Islamic Law in Ottoman Syria
and Palestine. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1999.
Van Den Boogert, Maurits H. The Capitulations and The Ottoman Legal System. Leiden:
Brill, 2005.
Veinstein, Gilles. “Religious institutions, policies and lives,” in The Cambridge History
of Turkey, Volume 2: The Ottoman Empire as a World Power, 1453-1603. Eds. Suraiya
N. Faroqhi and Kate Fleet. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Winter, Michael. Egyptian Society Under Ottoman Rule: 1517-1798. New York:
Routledge, 1992.
Yilmaz, Mehmet S. “Crime and Punishment in the Imperial Historiography of Suleyman
the Magnificent: An Evaluation of Nişancı Celâlzâde’s View.” Acta Orientalia
Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, Vol. 60, No. 4 (2007): 427-445
Ze’evi, Dror. Producing Desire: Changing Sexual Discourse in the Ottoman Middle East,
1500-1900. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006.
------."Evidence in Ottoman Courts: Oral and Written Documentation in Early-Modern
Courts of Islamic Law." Journal of the American Oriental Society 124, no. 3 (2004): 47191.
Zilfi, Madeline C. “Kanun.” In Oxford Islamic Studies Online.
------. “Sultan Suleyman and the Ottoman Religious Establishment,” in Suleyman the
Second and His Time. Eds. Halil Inalcik and Cemal Kafadar. Istanbul: The Isis Press,
1993, pp. 109-120.
Figure 1: Imber, Colin. The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power. New
York & London: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2002, p. ix.

150

